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ADJUSTMENT TO HARDSHIP CAUSED BY 
IMPORTS: THE NEW DECISIONS OF THE 
TARIFF COMMISSION AND THE NEED 
FOR LEGISLATIVE CLARIFICATION 
Carl H. Fulda* 
I. GATT AND THE ESCAPE CLAUSE 
THE General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade,1 known as GA TT, embodies the commitments of its contracting parties, now num-
bering eighty countries,2 to enter "into reciprocal and mutual advan-
tageous arrangements directed to the substantial reduction of tariffs 
and other barriers to trade and to the elimination of discriminatory 
treatment in international commerce."8 
The GA TT provision that concerns us here is article XIX, which 
permits "Emergency Action on Import of Particular Products." Ob-
viously, an international arrangement by which tariffs have been 
reduced in successive stages over the years is bound to create some 
hardships for importing countries. Accordingly, article XIX, para-
graph l(a) provides: 
If, as a result of unforeseen developments and of the effect of the 
obligations incurred by a contracting party under this agreement, 
including tariff concessions, any product is being imported into the 
territory of that contracting party in such increased quantities and 
under such conditions as to cause or threaten serious injury to do-
mestic. producers in that territory of like or directly competitive 
products, the contracting party shall be free, in respect of such pro-
duct, and to the extent and for such time as may be necessary to 
prevent or remedy such injury, to suspend the obligation in whole 
or in part or to ·withdraw or modify the concession. 
The contracting party whose interest as exporter of the product con-
cerned is affected by such "escape clause" action may suspend "sub-
stantially equivalent concessions or other obligations."4 Language 
• Hugh Lamar Stone Professor of Law, University of Texas. J.U.D. 1931, University 
of Freiburg; LL.B. 1938, Yale University.-Ed. 
1. 61 Stat. pt. 5, at A3 (1947), T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T .S. 194. For recent studies 
see K. DAM, THE GATT; LAW AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION (1970); 
J. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT (1969). 
2, GATT Press Release No. 1091 (1971). Several other countries (most of them in 
Africa) apply the General Agreement on a de facto basis. GATT, 17th Supp. BASIC 
INSTRUMENTS AND SELEcrED DOCUMENTS, at VII (1970) [hereinafter BISD]. 
3. GATT, Preamble. 
4. GATT, art. XIX, para. 3(a). 
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similar in effect to the section of article XIX quoted above was in-
corporated by Congress into section 7 of the Trade Agreement Ex-
tension Act of 1951,6 which remained in effect until 1962.0 
II. THE TRADE EXPANSION Ac:r: OF 1962 
The requirements for relief under the escape clause were made 
more severe by the Trade Expansion Act of 1962.7 Upon request by 
the President, resolution by the congressional committees having 
jurisdiction over trade matters, its own motion, or petition by a trade 
association, firm, or union, the Tariff Commission shall 
make an investigation to determine whether, as a result in major 
part of concessions granted under trade agreements, an article is being 
imported into the United States in such increased quantities as to 
cause, or threaten to cause, serious injury to the domestic industry 
producing an article which is like or directly competitive with the 
imported article.s 
... Increased imports shall be considered to cause, or threaten 
to cause, serious injury to the domestic industry concerned when the 
Tariff Commission finds that such increased imports have been the 
major factor in causing, or threatening to cause, such injury.0 
This language has been held to establish four prerequisites for 
an affirmative finding with respect to an industry, on the basis of 
which the President "may proclaim such increase in, or imposition 
of~ any duty or other import restriction on the article causing or 
threatening to cause serious injury to such industry as he determines 
to be necessary to prevent or remedy serious injury to such indus-
try.''10 These prerequisites are 
(I) Imports of a like or competitive article produced by the 
domestic industry must be increasing; 
(2) The increased imports must be in major part the result of 
trade agreement concessions; 
(3) The domestic industry producing the like or competitive 
article must be suffering serious injury or be threatened with serious 
injury; and 
5. Ch. 141, § 7, 65 Stat. 72, repealed by Trade Expansion Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 
87-794, 76 Stat. 872. 
6. See Metzger, The Escape Clause and Adjustment Assistance: Proposals and As• 
sessments, 2 LAw & POLICY IN INTL. Bus. 352, 357-58 (1970). 
7 •. A~ of Oct. 11, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-794, '76 Stat. 872, 19 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1991 
(1970). 
8. 19 U.S.C. § 190l(b)(l) (1970). 
9. 19 U.S.C. § 190l(b)(3) (1970). 
10. 19 U.S.C. § I98l(a)(l) (1970). 
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(4) The increased imports must be the major factor in causing or 
threatening to cause serious injury.11 
This statute differs from the prior American law and from article 
XIX of GA TT in two respects. First, to obtain tariff adjustments it 
is now necessary to show that increased imports were caused in major 
part by concessions under trade agreements. Prior to 1962 the Tariff 
Commission had to "determine whether any product upon which a 
concession [had] been granted under a trade agreement [was], as a 
result, in whole or in part, of the duty or other customs treatment 
reflecting such concessions, being imported into the United States in 
such increased quantities ... as to cause or threaten serious injury 
to the domestic industry producing like or directly competitive pro-
ducts.''12 Under this pre-1962 language, it was easy to find that tariff 
concessions were in part the cause of increased imports. Indeed, the 
Tariff Commission seemed to have assumed without discussion that 
this causal relationship was present in every case.13 Second, under the 
present law the concession-generated imports must be the major 
factor of actual or threatened serious injury to the industry. Prior 
to 1962 increased imports were to "be considered as the cause or 
threat of serious injury to the domestic industry producing like or 
directly competitive products when the Commission finds that such 
increased imports have contributed substantially toward causing or 
threatening to cause serious injury to such industry."14 Thus the 
11. See, e.g., Nonrubber Footwear, Tariff Commn. Publ. No. 359, at 6 Gan. 1971) 
(views of Commissioners Clubb and Moore). The same enumeration is found in nu-
merous other Commission reports explaining the statutory requirements. 
12. Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1951, ch. 141, § 7(a), 65 Stat. 74 (emphasis 
added). The words "in whole or in part" seem in practical result identical with art. 
XIX, para. l(a) of GA'IT, which cites as two causes for increased imports "unforeseen 
developments" and "tariff concessions." 
13. See, e.g., Groundfish Fillets, Tariff Commn. Report No. 25, at 16 (May 1954): 
"[I]t is manifest that with a continuation of the present tariff treatment imports ••• 
will continue to capture an increasing share • • • ." The duty under the Tariff Act of 
1930 of 2-1/2¢ per pound bad been reduced in 1938 to 1-7 /8¢ on an annual tariff quota. 
There was no discussion whether the imports bad been the result of the reduction in 
duty. Accord, Ferrocerium (Lighter Flints) and All Other Cerium Alloys, Tariff Commn. 
Report No. 41 (Dec. 1955), in which "findings" that as a result of a 50% reduction in 
the 1930 tariff, imports had increased were not supported by any discussion. Concerning 
this attitude of the Commission, H.R. REP. No. 1761, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1958), 
stated: 
The Committee considered the Tariff Commission's explanation of its under-
standing as to the necessary causal relationship, in escape clause cases, between 
the tariff concession in question and the increased imports. It agreed that the 
Commission is warranted in considering that, when increased imports of a product 
on which a concession has been granted cause serious injury, there is sufficient evi-
dence that the level of the existing duty reflecting the concession contributes, in 
part, at least, to such increased imports. 
14. Trade Agreement Extension Act of 1955, ch. 169, § 6, 69 Stat. 166 (1955) (em-
phasis added). 
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1962 Act established two causation requirements with a stiffer burden 
of proof for the industry seeking tariff relief. 
But these were not the only changes in 1962. In addition to tariff 
adjustment for an industry, two new remedies were created. Firms 
and groups of workers were authorized to petition for adjustment 
assistance. To qualify for such individual relief the petitioners have 
to meet the same four prerequisites set forth above for tariff relief.16 
Moreover, the remedies provided for tariff adjustment and firm and 
worker adjustment may be combined: When the President receives 
a recommendation for tariff adjustment, he may also certify the firms 
and workers of such industry for individual adjustments or choose 
one or the other of these remedies.16 
The substantive benefits of individual adjustment assistance are 
set forth in the statute in some detail.17 They consist of technical, 
financial, and tax assistance for firms18 and of trade readjustment and 
relocation allowances and training programs for workers.10 The 
Secretaries of Commerce and Labor, respectively, are charged with 
administration and supervision,20 
The two individual remedies were added because it was felt that 
tariff adjustment alone was insufficient to protect American firms 
and workers. The Committee on Ways and Means, in reporting the 
bill that became the Trade Expansion Act, explained: 
Under current law no relief whatsoever is available to firms and 
workers injured by imports unless their injury is shared by a large 
part of their industry. Furthermore the granting of tariff adjustment 
in particular cases necessarily has an impact on our total foreign 
economic policy. It necessitates the granting of tariff compensation 
15. 19 U.S.C. § 190l(c)(l)·(3) (1970) basically provides that firms and workers must 
show that "as a result in major part of concessions granted under trade agreements 
••• an article like or directly competitive with an article produced by the firm" or 
"by such workers' firm, or an appropriate subdivision thereof," "is being imported 
••• in such increased quantities as to cause, or threaten to cause, serious injury to 
such firm" or "unemployment or underemployment of a significant number • • • of the 
workers of such firm or subdivision." In both types of petitions it must be shown that 
the increased imports "have been the major factor in causing, or threatening to cause, 
such injury or unemployment or underemployment." Tariff Commission regulations 
with respect to the filing of petitions by industries, firms, and workers are found in 
19 C.F.R. pt. 206 (1971). 
16. 19 U.S.C. § 1902(a) (1970). 
17. For a thorough analysis of "the substance of current adjustment assistance 
benefits" and "proposals for improvement under an expanded program," see Metzger, 
supra note 6, at 389-400. 
18. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1911-20 (1970). See 15 C.F.R. §§ 610.1-.42 (1971). 
19. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1931-78 (1970). See 29 C.F.R. §§ 90.1-91.28 (1971}, 
20. This authority is found in various parts of 19 U.S.C. §§ 1902-78 (1970). 
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to our trading partners on other products in order to counterbalance 
whatever U.S. Tariffs are raised under the escape clause.21 
Under this view relief to firms and workers is always a good thing, 
while upsetting tariff concessions and risking retaliation is something 
which should be reserved for grave situations only. This would be 
a plausible policy, but if Congress had wished to adopt it, it would 
surely have used different language in expressing the eligibility re-
quirements for individual as distinguished from industry assistance. 
Since it used the same language, it is clear that the requirements 
for adjustment assistance to industries, firms, and workers were in-
tended to be identical.22 
III. THE FIRST SEVEN YEARS UNDER THE 1962 Am:: 
No RELIEF FOR .ANYoNE 
From the time of the enactment of the Trade Expansion Act 
through October 1969, no petitions for tariff adjustment or for ad-
justment assistance to firms or workers were granted. During that 
period there were thirteen petitions by industries,23 eight petitions 
by :firms,24 and six petitions by workers.25 Thus "we have played 
21. H.R. REP. No. 1818 (Trade Expansion Act of 1962), 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 13 
(1962). See Metzger, supra note 6, at 379. 
22. Professor Metzger, while chairman of the Tariff Commission, pointed out that 
the House Report (supra note 21, at 23) stated that the test for adjustment assistance to 
firms "is substantially the same" as that for tariff adjustments; he suggested that this 
similarity is not synonymous with identical, and, therefore, in borderline cases, the 
causation criterion should be relaxed in adjustment assistance cases. Supplementary 
statement of Chairman Metzger, Barbers' Chairs, Tariff Commn. Pub!. No. 228, at 19-20 
(Jan. 1968) (emphasis added). This suggestion has not been accepted by other members 
of the Commission. Professor Metzger conceded that his approach was not very pre-
cise and permitted "very limited leeway." Id. at 20. 
23. Hatter's Fur, Tariff Commn. Pub!. No. 82 (April 1963); Household China Table-
ware, Tariff Commn. Pub!. No. 84 (April 1963); Earthenware Table & Kitchen Articles, 
Tariff Commn. Pub!. No. 86 (April 1963); Softwood Lumber, Tariff Commn. Puhl: 
No. 79 (Feb. 1963); Whisky, Tariff Commn. Pub!. No. 89 (April 1963); Watches, Tariff 
Commn. Pub!. No. 142 (Oct. 1964); Umbrellas, Tariff Commn. Pub!. No. 136 (Sept. 
1964); Ice Skates, Tariff Commn. Pub!. No. 149 (Feb. 1965); Mushrooms, Tariff Commn. 
Pub!. No. 148 (Jan. 1965); Eyeglass Frames, Tariff Commn. Publ. No. 219 (Oct, 1967); 
Barbers' Chairs, Tariff Commn. Pub!. No. 228 (Jan. 1968); Broomcorn, Tariff Commn. 
Pub!. No. 238 (March 1968); Canned Sardines, Tariff Commn. Publ. No. 291 CTuly 
1969). 
24. Barbers' Chairs, Tariff Commn. Publ. No. 229 CTan, 1968); Barbers' Chairs, 
Tariff Commn. Pub!. No. 230 (Jan. 1968); Household China Tableware, Tariff Commn. 
Pub!. No. 85 (April 1963); Crude Petroleum, Tariff Commn. Pub!. No. 134 (Aug. 1964); 
Plywood Door Skins, Tariff Commn. Pub!. No. 162 (Oct. 1965) (Commission equally 
divided); Sodium Gluconate, Technical, Tariff Commn. Pub!. No. 101 (July 1963); 
Ceramic Mosaic Tile, Tariff Commn. Pub!. No. 85 (April 1963); National Tile & Mfg. 
Co., Tariff Commn. Pub!. No. 145 (Dec. 1964) (Commission equally divided). 
25. Unmanufactured Zinc, Tariff Commn. Publ •. No. 81 (March 1963); Ceramic Mo-
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false" with the expectations of the Congress that enacted the Trade 
Expansion Act of 1962 and particularly of those who relied on the 
promise of individual relief held out in that Act.26 
This disappointment of expectations was attn1mtable to the cau-
sation requirements of the 1962 Act, which, as explained above, re-
quired a finding that the increase of imports was due in major part 
to tariff concession and that such increases were the major factor in 
causing serious injury to industries and firms and in causing work-
ers' unemployment. The first of the causation requirements-in-
crease of imports due to concessions-was particularly troublesome. 
For instance, in its 1963 escape-clause investigation in Softwoocl 
Lumber,27 the Commission said: 
[M]aximum stimulation of imports attributable to a reduction in 
duty generally occurs directly or shortly after the reduced rates come 
into effect. The interval during which the reduction in duty operates 
to cause imports to continue rising varies with the commodity and 
attendant circumstances. In the instant case, some of the trade agree-
ment reductions in duty were made as far back as 1936, and none 
were made more recently than 1948. The duty reductions made on 
softwood lumber so long ago can no longer be more than a negli-
gible cause of lumber being imported in increased quantities .... 2s 
Consequently, the Commission did not have to reach the issue 
whether there was serious injury caused in major part by the in-
creased imports.29 
In disposing of petitions for adjustment assistance by firms and 
workers, the Commission also made negative findings on both causa-
tion requirements.30 In one case brought by a firm, two Commis-
sioners who voted against relief stated that "the major factor" meant 
"the one that dominates the overall result," not merely the most 
saic Tile, Tariff Commn. Publ. No. 115 (Nov. 1963); Transistor Radios, Tariff Commn. 
Publ. No. 91 (May 1963); Iron Ore, Tariff Commn. Publ. No. 96 Ouly 1963); Cotton 
Sheeting Workers, Tariff Commn. Publ. No. 100 Ouly 1963); Men's Leather Footwear, 
Tariff Commn. Publ. No. 232 (March 1968). 
26. Statement of W. Wirtz, former Secretary of Labor, Hearings on Foreign Trade 
and Tariff Proposals Before the Comm. on Ways and Means, 90th Cong., 2d Scss. 38 
(1968). 
27. Softwood Lumber, Tariff Commn. Publ. No. 79 (Feb. 1963). 
28. Id. at 10. Accord, Earthenware Table &: Kitchen Articles, Tariff Commn. Pub]. 
No. 86, at 5 (April 1963); Broomcorn, Tariff Commn. Publ. No. 238, at 3-4, 7 (March 
1968). 
29. Softwood Lumber, supra note 27, at 21. For discussion of other cases, see Banner, 
"In Major-Part"-The New Causation Problem in the Trade-Agreements Program, 44 
TEXAS L. R.Ev. 1331, 1336-43 (1966). 
30. The decisions on firms' and workers' petitions are reviewed in Banner, supra 
note 29, at 1345-56. 
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important in a series of factors.31 In a workers' case, the Commission 
rejected the argument that more liberal standards than thbse ap-
plicable to industry or firm investigations should be applied and 
denied the petition on the ground that eight years had elapsed since 
the last tariff concession.32 Although these reductions maintained 
imports "at a higher level than would presumably have prevailed 
otherwise, ... the major stimuli to increased imports in recent years 
are to be found primarily in factors other than the trade-agreement 
concessions. "33 
IV. THE FIRST DECISIONS BREAKING NEW GROUND 
In November 1969 the Commission, with one dissent, granted 
for the first time three workers' petitions for adjustment assistance. 
The first, Buttweld Pipe,34 involved the workers at a plant of the 
Armco Steel Corporation, whose multimillion dollar production 
complex capable of producing large quantities of welded pipe had 
been shut down. Imports had increased during the past ten years. 
The statutory duty rate of $15 per ton prevailing in 193035 had been 
cut in half in 1948 and further reduced to $6 in 1958. Commissioners 
Sutton, Thunberg, and Newsom explained that imports could com-
pete with domestic products only if they were priced lower in order 
to compensate the buyer for longer delivery times, limited services, 
and the advance planning necessary for dealing with foreign sup-
pliers.86 The average landed value of imports during the five years 
preceding the shutdmvn was estimated to be from 9% to 19% lower 
than the average value of domestic shipments. Without the reduction 
of $9 in import duties, i.e., the total reductions below the 1930 rate, 
import values would have been in the range of 4% to 13% below 
the average domestic values. Hence the increased imports had been 
stimulated in major part by the price advantage resulting from tariff 
concessions under GA TT and the loss of 350 jobs was the result of 
these imports.87 It should be noted that the largest concession was 
81. National Tile 8: Mfg. Co., Tariff Commn. Publ. No. 145, at 7 (Dec. 1964). 
82. Cotton Sheeting Workers, Tariff Commn. Publ. No. 100 CTuly 1968). 
33. Id. at 7. The other factors were disparities between the costs of foreign and 
domestic fabricators and the price-support program of the Department of Agriculture. 
34. :Buttweld Pipe, Tariff Commn. Publ. No. 297 (Nov. 1969). 
35. The 1930 statutory duty was one of the rates established by the Tariff Act of 
1930, ch. 497, 46 Stat. 590. That Act, popularly known as the Smoot-Hawley Act, was the 
high-water mark of American protectionism. See C. FULDA&: W. SCHWARTZ, CASES AND 
l\{ATERIAU! ON THE REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INVESTMENT 179 (1970). 
36. Buttweld Pipe, supra note 34, at 5. 
37. Id. at 4-5. 
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granted 21 years, and the latest, a relatively small one, 11 years prior 
to the filing of the petition. 
A second opinion in the case by Commissioners Thunberg, Clubb, 
and Moore was even more explicit. It set forth the four requirements 
for relief under the statute, the large increase in imports from 1963 
to 1968, 88 and then quoted the House and Senate Reports that ex-
plained the phrase "as a result of concessions granted under trade 
agreements" as meaning "the aggregate reduction which has been 
arrived at by means of a trade agreement or trade agreements 
(whether entered into under . . . this bill or under Section 350 of 
the Tariff Act of 1930)."39 Accordingly, Commissioners Thunberg, 
Clubb, and Moore proclaimed the necessity to consider 
the total reductions made since the beginning of the trade agree-
ments program, not just the most recent reduction ...• In determin-
ing whether the increased imports are a result "in major part" of 
the aggregate of concessions granted since 1934, we need ask ourselves 
only whether, but for the concessions, would imports be substan-
tially at their present leveI.40 
Answering this question in the negative, the three Commissioners 
emphasized that price was "the single most significant factor" in this 
market and that "about two-thirds of the importers' price advantage 
is occasioned by the trade agreements concessions."41 
The "but for" test was also held applicable to the second causa-
tion requirement. The mill was said to be struggling with "inflation 
and other factors" that caused its cost to rise while "import compe-
tition from countries with a lesser rate of inflation tended to keep 
the price of its products down." Thus a mill which was "marginal 
even under normal circumstances became submarginal because of 
its inability to meet the price competition from imported pipe." 
Hence "but for the concession-generated increased imports this plant 
would probably have been able to stay in business."42 
38. Id. at 7-8. 
39. H.R. REP. No. 1818, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 46 (1962); S. REP. No. 2059, 87th Cong., 
2d Sess. 20 (1962), quoted in Buttweld Pipe, supra note 34, at 8-9 n.4. 
40. Buttweld Pipe, supra note 34, at 9-10 (emphasis added). Nineteen thirty-four 
was the year of the enactment of the first Reciprocal Trade Agreement Act, Act of 
June 12, 1934, ch. 474, 48 Stat. 943. This Act granted authority to the President "to 
enter into foreign trade agreements with foreign governments ••• [and] to proclaim 
such modifications of existing duties and other import restrictions ••• as are required 
or appropriate to carry out any foreign trade agreement that the President has entered 
into hereunder." There was a 50% limitation, upward or downward, on modifications 
of existing duties, and this limitation was continued in all subsequent statutes. See 
19 U.S.C. § 182l(b) (1970). 
41. Buttweld Pipe, supra note 34, at 10-11. 
42, Id. at 12-13. 
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In Transmission Towers and Parts,43 decided simultaneously with 
Buttweld Pipe, the Commission, again by votes of five to one, granted 
petitions by workers of the United States Steel Corporation's Pitts-
burgh and Los Angeles plants. The statutory rate of 20% had been 
lowered to 7.5% by reductions in 1935, 1948, and 1951 with a further 
reduction of 0.5% taking effect on January I, 1968-a total reduc-
tion of 65%.44 The price advantage of imported towers was $44 per 
ton or more.45 This was more than twice the differential permitted 
by regulations under the Buy American Act for purchase of foreign-
made materials by federal agencies.46 Accordingly, the majority con-
cluded that but for the duty reductions imports would not have in-
creased "in recent years"47 and that unemployment would not have 
occurred but for the increased imports.48 
Commissioner Leonard dissented in both the Buttweld Pipe and 
Transmission Towers cases.49 He rejected the "but for" test as irrecon-
cilable ·with the statutory language of "in major part," which was de-
signed to make relief available "only in exceptional circumstances." 
Only Congress could liberalize these requirements.50 Specifically, 
he pointed out in Buttweld Pipe that the plant had been built more 
than nvo years after the last tariff reduction took effect; therefore, 
the employer could not have been concerned about low tariffs. More-
over, the ratio of imports to domestic production remained steady 
except in 1968 with domestic production increasing along with im-
ports. An extraordinary increase in imports in 1968 was due to the 
imminence of a strike in the steel industry that prompted customers 
to increase their inventories.51 In Transmission Towers, Commis-
sioner Leonard noted that there was no substantial connection be-
tween the duty reductions, which, in practical effect, ended in 1951 
and the imports, which began to pick up fifteen years Iater.112 
43. Transmission Towers & Parts, Tariff Com.nm. Publ. No. 298 (Nov. 1969) [here-
inafter Transmission Towers I]. Accord, Transmission Towers & Parts, Tariff Commn. 
Publ. No. 316 (March 1970) (production at a modern plant had ceased because of loss 
of federal agency contracts to cheaper foreign suppliers). 
44. See Transmission Towers I, supra note 43, at II. 
45. Id. at 4. 
46. See id. at 4. Under the Buy American Act, 41 U.S.C. § IO(a)-(d) (1970), American 
materials are required for public use unless the head of the federal agency concerned 
determines that acquisition of American materials is "inconsistent with the public in-
terest, or the cost ••• unreasonable." See 41 C.F.R. § 1-6.104-4 (1971). 
47. Transmission Towers I, supra note 43, at IO. No precise figures of increased 
imports were given. 
48. Id. at 4. 
49. Butl:lveld Pipe, supra note 34, at 16; Transmission Towers I, supra note 43, at 15. 
50. Transmission Towers I, supra note 43, at 18. 
51. Butl:lveld Pipe, supra note 34, at 17-18. 
52. Transmission Towers I, supra note 43, at 22. 
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These decisions, coming after seven years of hopeless efforts, pro-
duced a veritable flood of new petitions, particularly by workers. 
Indeed, in 1970 and 1971, the Commission decided 110 workers' 
petitions, twenty-seven firm petitions (by relatively small enterprises), 
and eight industry petitions. Fourteen of the workers' petitions and 
five of the firm petitions were granted. The Commission was equally 
divided in twenty-five workers' cases; in all of these the President 
broke the tie vote and directed that assistance be granted.08 With 
respect to firm petitions, the Commission was equally divided in seven 
cases: in all except one, decided in November 1971, the President has 
certified the firms as eligible. In the escape clause investigations, a 
majority of the Commission granted relief in one case; the Com-
mission was equally divided in three cases and in two of these the 
President broke the tie vote. We must, then, try to analyze these 
decisions for the purpose of obtaining a comprehensive picture of 
the present state of the case law. 
V. DECISIONS OF THE TARIFF COMMISSION SUBSEQUENT 
TO BUTIWELD PIPE AND TRANSMISSION TOWERS 
The novelty of the Buttweld Pipe and Transmission Towers 
cases consists of the adoption of the "but for" test for measuring 
causation. This is a shorthand expression for a rather complicated 
problem: Is it _necessary in order to find causation that increases 
in imports occur immediately or within a short time after tariff re-
ductions take effect? Or is the length of the time interval between 
tariff reductions and increased imports irrelevant? If the interval is 
irrelevant, is it sufficient to show that maintenance of the statutory 
rate prevailing in 1930 would have prevented the present growth 
of imports? Could there still be reasons other than tariff concessions 
or increases in concession-generated imports that would destroy both 
causation requirements? Finally, what type of relief, if any, should 
53. The President's authority to break a tie vote, never exercised by Presidents Ken• 
nedy and Johnson, is based on § 330(d) of the Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. 1330(d) 
(1970), which applies to "any case calling for findings of the Commission in connection 
with any authority conferred upon the President by law to make changes in import 
restrictions •••• " A petition for tariff adjustment under the escape clause obviously 
presents such a case. Petitions for adjustment assistance by firms and workers, however, 
do not lead to "changes in import restrictions." Hence, Commissioners Sutton, Leonard, 
and Newsom have contended that the "tie vote" provision does not apply in such cases. 
Women's &: Misses' Dress Shoes with Leather, Vinyl or Fabric Uppers, Tariff Commn. 
Puhl. No. 323, at 7-10 Oune 1970); Men's, Youth's &: Boys' Footwear of Leather, Tariff 
Commn. Puhl. No. 324, at 7-9 Oune 1970). The Attorney General advised the President 
that he has authority to break tie votes in firms' and workers' cases. White House Press 
Release of Oct. 7, 1970, 6 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS 1345 (1970). The 
Attorney General's memorandum has not been published. 
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be granted? The following brief analysis of the Commission's deci-
sions ·will consider how these questions have been answered. 
A. Escape Clause Cases 
In Pianos and Parts Thereof, 54 a majority of three Commissioners 
recommended that the industry be given tariff relief. Imports began 
to increase in the mid-fifties. The statutory tariff had been cut in 
half in 1951. This cut was followed by minor reductions during the 
period of 1956 to 1958 and further reductions of 2% and 1.5% on 
January 1, 1968, and January 1, 1969, respectively.55 Commissioners 
Clubb and Moore, citing their opinions in the Buttweld Pipe and 
Transmission Towers cases, applied the "but for" test;56 Commis-
sioner Leonard, concurring, did not. 57 He observed that the most 
dramatic upsurge of imports had followed the Kennedy Round re-
ductions in 1968 and 1969. (Imports increased in 1968 by more than 
70% and in 1969 by more than 100% over the 1965-1967 average.) 
He noted that there were reasons other than these increased imports58 
for the idling of capacity, the losses by one third of the firms, and 
the decline in employment, but held that the spectacular recent rise 
in imports was the major factor in threatening to cause serious in-
jury. 59 The two dissenters denied such a threat, arguing that "rela-
tively low profit rates" were accompanied by stable demand.60 The 
President suspended tariff reductions, which were scheduled to take 
effect in 1970, 1971, and 1972, and authorized firms and workers 
to apply for adjustment assistance.61 It should be noted that, as 
Commissioner Leonard's opinion indicates, the "but for" test was 
not necessary to reach an affirmative finding in this case. 
Barbers' Chairs and Parts Thereo/62 was an atypical escape clause 
54, Pianos &: Parts Thereof, Tariff Comm.n. Publ. No. 309 (Dec. 1969). Five Commis-
sioners voted; one was absent. 
55. Id. at 5. 
56. Id. at 5. 
57. Id. at 9. 
58. Id. at 13. "The changing pattern of life in the United States," (e.g., "growing 
interest in other musical instruments and many other kinds of recreation"). 
59. Id, at 10-11. 
60. Id. at 23, 
ol. Proclamation No. 3964, 35 Fed. Reg. 3645 (1970). See White House statement 
accompanying the proclamation in 6 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRF.SIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS 261, 
262 (1970), stressing that this was a case "for which adjustment assistance was meant 
to apply." 
62. Barbers' Chairs &: Parts Thereof, Tariff Commn. Publ. No. 319 (April 1970) 
[hereinafter Barbers' Chairs I]. In a preceding investigation the Commission had de-
nied relief. Barbers' Chairs, Tariff Commn. Publ. No. 228 (Jan. 1968). The industry 
consisted of only two firms, one of which was doing well. The increase in imports was 
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case in which the Commission was equally divided. One of the two 
domestic firms had been absorbed by the principal Japanese exporter 
of barber chairs who had thus obtained a dominant position in 
the United States market, which he exploited by raising his prices. 
The three Commissioners, voting against relief for the remaining 
American-mvned firm, attributed that firm's serious injury to ineffi-
ciency and to unlawful conduct by its Japanese rival; 03 hence trade 
concessions and increased imports were irrelevant. Indeed, it would 
appear that the acquisition by the Japanese producer of an American 
firm in an industry consisting of only two firms of equal size was a 
violation of section 7 of the Clayton Act.64 In any event, there was 
only one firm that needed relief; therefore individual adjustment 
assistance was the proper remedy.65 
·Nonrubber Footwear,66 an investigation undertaken at the re-
quest of the President, resulted in an equally divided report on 
which the President took no action. Commissioners Clubb and Moore 
based their affirmative votes on the "but for" test that they had pre-
viously espoused67 but they could not gamer additional votes because 
attributed to the rise of Japan as an industrial power, the effective distribution in the 
United States of Japanese imports, and the reduction in ocean freight rates. 
63. :Barbers' Chairs I, supra note 62, at 10-11. 
·54. Compare United States v. Monsanto Co., 1967 Trade Cas. 1f 72,001 (W.D. Pa, 
1967), in which a joint venture between Monsanto and a leading German chemical 
firm was prohibited because of its adverse effect on competition in the United States. 
For comments on the case, see the statement by E.M. Zimmerman, Assistant Attorney 
General, Antitrust Division, in Hearings on International Aspects of Antitrust Before 
the Subcomm. of Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th 
Cong., 2d Sess. 502 (1966). 
65. In the petition filed by the Emil J. Paidar Co., :Barbers' Chairs 8: Parts Thereof, 
Tariff Commn. Puhl. No. 320 (April 1970), the three Commissioners who had voted 
against relief in the escape clause investigation again voted to deny relief. Id, at 4. 
Commissioners Clubb, Moore, and Thunberg voted for relief on the ground that the 
most recent reduction in duties from 10% to 8% ad valorem had made Paidar's situa-
tion hopeless. Id. at 7-8, 14. The President authorized adjustment assistance "for cur-
rent operations and to expand production of other types of professional equipment," 
but refused tariff relief because it would "curtail imports." White House statement of 
June 23, 1970, 6 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRE.5IDENTIAL DOCUMENTS 808 (1970). 
66. Nonrubber Footwear, Tariff Commn. Puhl. No. 359 Gan. 1971), noted in Recent 
Decision, 7 TEXAS INTI.. L.J. 163 (1971). 
67. Nonrubber Footwear, supra note 66, at 13. The duties on 60% of the men's 
footwear and 55% of the women's footwear imports were cut from the statutory level 
of 20% and 35%, respectively, to 8.5% and 6%, respectively. In the first category there 
were no cuts between 1943 and 1968; in the second category the first cut occurred in 
1963. One hundred thirteen firms had sustained losses, output and profits of others 
declined, and imports accounted for one third of the United States market. This situa-
tion constituted a threat to the American industries involved, which could be remedied 
by tariff increases on four items and "an adjustment assistance program" for firms and 
workers. Id. at 24a. 
See also :Bagatelle, :Billiard &: Pool :Balls, Tariff Commn. Puhl. No. 374 (March 1971), 
in which there was a unanimous negative finding. Commissioners Clubb and Moore 
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only four Commissioners participated in the decision.68 Commission-
ers Sutton and Leonard voted in the negative. They pointed out 
that the time lag between the concessions and the increased imports 
was so long as to negative causation and that the Kennedy Round 
reductions, which began on January I, 1968, were irrelevant because 
imports increased sharply prior to that date.69 Moreover, the bulk 
of the reductions on the most important items on women's shoes was 
attributable to the adoption of the Tariff Schedules of the United 
States and not to the Kennedy Round.7° Commissioner Leonard 
called attention to the disparity between United States and foreign 
wage rates, limited gains in American productivity, and rapid United 
States price increases, all of which he considered more important 
factors than tariff reductions.71 In short, the erosion of American 
competitiveness was primarily due to inflation. 
It should be noted that shortly before this decision was handed 
down the House of Representatives passed The Trade Act of 
1970,72 a bill that provided for mandatory quotas on "the total 
quantity of each category of textile articles and ... of footwear arti-
cles ... produced in any foreign country which ..• shall not exceed 
the average annual quantity of such category produced in such coun-
try and entered during 1967, 1968, and 1969." The bill died in the 
Senate with the expiration of the Ninety-first Congress. The contrast 
between this very drastic measure, which would have violated the 
prohibition of quotas in article XI, paragraph 1 of GATT,73 and 
the modest proposals for industry relief by Commissioners Clubb 
and Moore,74 who found no present injury but only a threat of in-
jury, is most striking. It shows that even the members of the Tariff 
Commission most inclined to grant industry and individual relief 
are likely to recommend measures far more compatible with the 
found the first causation requirement satisfied by the "but for" test, but found no 
causation of serious injury. Id. at 4-6. Commissioners Sutton and Leonard denied first 
causation on the ground that the concessions were made 25 years ago. Id. at 3. 
68. At the time of this decision the office of chairman was vacant, and Commissioner 
Young did not participate. 
69. Nonrubber Footwear, supra note 66, at 38. 
70. Id. at 29. 
71. Id. at 44-45. 
72. H.R. 18970, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., § 20l(a) (1970). 
73. See Fulda, :Book Review, 69 MICH. L. R.Ev. 783, 784 (1971). 
74. Commissioners Clubb and Moore recommended that the minor tariff reductions 
of the Kennedy Round on the most important item of men's foot:lvear be cancelled, 
and that the tariff which was in effect in 1969 on three items of women's foot:l'lear 
be maintained, thus eliminating the reductions scheduled for 1970, 1971, and 1972. 
Nonrubber Footwear, supra note 66, at 14, 17, 24a. 
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GA TT system of liberalized trade than a Congress bending under 
protectionist pressures. The escape clause and individual adjustment 
assistance thus provide a necessary safety valve without which trade 
liberalization could not continue. 
The remaining recent decisions further illustrate that the ravages 
of United States inflation exceed the damage attributed to tariff con-
cessions. Indeed, in Umbrellas and Metal Parts,1° Commissioners 
Clubb and Moore observed that "even the imposition of the 1930 
rates of duty would not have substantially affected U. S. imports 
of umbrellas"76 because average wholesale prices of imports would 
still be $17 per dozen cheaper than domestic articles.77 Similarly, 
in Flat Glass and Tempered Glass,18 it was noted that the increase 
in prices of glass in the domestic market "has eroded materially the 
protective effect of U. S. import duties"79 and "made the U. S. mar-
ket attractive to foreign suppliers."80 In this case, the Commission 
denied relief for four types of glass products but was equally divided 
in regard to sheet glass, which the majority considered to be a sepa• 
rate industry. Sheet glass had been the subject of escape clause relief 
in 1962,81 which had been terminated for some items and reduced 
for others in 1967.82 These reduced increases were scheduled to ex-
pire on March 31, 1970.83 Three Commissioners recommended relief 
for sheet glass on the ground that the 1967 modifications of the es-
cape clause relief were the major cause of increased imports,84 which 
in tum caused a downward trend in profits. 85 They were, however, 
75. Umbrellas & Metal Parts Thereof, Tariff Commn. Puhl. No. 334 (Aug. 1970) 
(relief denied by 3-to-1 vote). 
76. Id. at 5. 
77. The average wholesale price of imported umbrellas at the statutory rate of 40% 
ad valorem would be $21 per dozen, compared with $38 per dozen for domestically 
produced products. Id. at 6. The duty for umbrellas was cut in half in 1950. Id. at A-4. 
78. Flat Glass & Tempered Glass, Tariff Commn. Puhl. No. 310 (Dec. 1969) (relief 
denied by 4-to-2 vote in the cases of rolled, plate, float, and tempered glass). 
79. Id. at 40. 
80. Id. at 41. 
'81. Proclamation No. 3455 of March 19, 1962 (76 Stat. 1454); Proclamation No. 3458 
of March 27, 1962 (76 Stat. 1457). Proclamation No. 3548 of Aug. 21, 1963 (77 Stat. 1017) 
pursuant to § 102 of the Tariff Classification Act of 1962 (19 U.S.C. § 1202 (1970)), 
incorporated the increased duties into the Tariff Schedules of the United States. 
82. Proclamation No. 3762 of Jan. 11, 1967 (81 Stat. 1076). 
83. Proclamation No.' 3816 of Oct. 11, 1967 (81 Stat. 1139); Proclamation No. 3951 
of Dec. 24, 1969, 34 Fed. Reg. 20381 (1969). 
84. Flat Glass & Tempered Glass, supra note 78, at 7. See also Sheet Glass (Blown 
or Drawn Flat Glass), Tariff Commn. Puhl. No. 306 (Dec. 1969). 
85. Flat Glass &: Tempered Glass, supra note 78, at 29. Commissioner Thunberg 
held that sheet glass was not a separate industry (id. at 19); Commissioner Leonard 
observed that decreased demand for sheet glass was not due to imports, but to increased 
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divided about the appropriate remedy: Commissioners Sutton and 
Moore recommended imposition of the statutory rates86 while Com-
missioner Clubb favored adjustment assistance to firms and workers 
rather than import restrictions.87 The President followed the latter 
course by directing the Secretaries of Commerce and Labor to certify 
eligible workers and firms for assistance. He also directed continua-
tion of the escape clause relief until January 31, 1972; thereafter 
it was to be phased out in a two-year period.88 The Commission has 
advised the President that a partial termination of the escape clause 
relief would adversely affect the sheet glass industry.89 
Marble and Travertine Products90 resulted in an equally divided 
Commission. Chairman Bedell91 and Commissioner Moore recom-
mended tariff increases that would restore the statutory rate for two 
items and exceed it with respect to one item.92 They argued that the 
"but for" test required this result while Commissioners Leonard 
and Young stressed that imports did not increase until ten years 
after the rates were cut in half.93 In their view, domestic inflation 
was the primary factor.94 Indeed, the data relied on by all four Com-
missioners indicated that restoration of statutory duties would not 
eliminate the price advantage of the imported articles.95 For that 
reason, and because he did not want to increase domestic construc-
tion costs, the President refused to proclaim tariff increases but asked 
the Secretaries of Labor and Commerce to consider requests for 
adjustment assistance by individual firms and workers.96 In the 
competition of float glass (id. at 35); Commissioner Newsom denied the existence of 
serious injury (id. at 43). 
86. Id. at 11. 
87. Id. at 31 ("[I]njury has been unevenly felt within the industry. Certain ag-
gressive firms with modem plants are very healthy and need no assistance to compete 
effectively ••• .''). 
88. Proclamation No. 3967 of Feb. 27, 1970, 35 Fed. Reg. 3975-77 (1970); White House 
Press Release, 6 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS 287 (1970). 
89. Sheet Glass (Blown or Drawn Flat Glass), Tariff Commn. Publ. No. 449 (Dec. 
1971). For subsequent developments see Proclamation No. 4102 of Jan. 29, 1972, 37 Fed. 
Reg. 2417; Flat Glass and Tempered Glass, Tariff Commn. Publ. No. 459 Gan. 1972). 
90. Marble&: Travertine Products, Tariff Commn. Publ. No. 420 (Sept. 1971). 
91. Commissioner Clubb's term had expired. 
92. Marble &: Travertine Products, supra note 90, at 16. 
93. Id. at 19. 
94. Id. at 23. 
95. Id. at 21. Significantly, the opinion by Chairman Bedell and Commissioner 
Moore, which recommended tariff relief, includes a table showing price comparisons 
on four domestic job sites, for three of which the delivered prices of foreign materials, 
taxed at the statutory rate, would be considerably lower than for domestically fabri-
cated goods. Id. at 12. 
96. 8 WEEKLY CoMP. OF PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS 148 (1972). The President also 
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last industry case of 1971, Television Receivers and Certain Parts 
Thereof,91 five Commissioners denied relief on the ground that the 
increased imports were due in major part to dumping rather than 
to trade concessions. 
It thus appears that the decisions on industry petitions since the 
end of 1969 dramatize the erosion of American competitiveness re-
sulting from domestic inflation. Indeed, there could be no more 
drastic evidence of this fact than the finding in some cases that 
restoration of the 1930 duties, the highest in United States history,08 
would not be sufficient protection. It should also be noted that in 
three of the industry investigations individual adjustment was chosen 
as the most appropriate remedy. Significantly, in two of these cases, 
the industry relief ultimately adopted consisted only of maintenance 
of the status quo by postponement of future reductions or continua-
tion of previously granted escape clause relief that otherwise would 
have expired. Last, but not least, in none of these decisions did the 
"but for" test prevail. 
B. Firm Petitions 
In two cases involving producers of Stainless-Steel Table Flat-
ware,99 causation presented no difficulties. In October 1967 the Pres-
ident allowed a tariff quota that had been in effect for eight years 
to expire, thus re-establishing the trade agreement concessions that 
had been suspended as a result of the escape clause action.100 Imme-
diately thereafter, imports increased rapidly from 9.2 million dozen 
pieces during the last year of the tariff quota to 34.4 million in 
1970.101 Substantial operating losses were suffered because of the pref-
erence for foreign supplies by the customers of the two firms.102 
Under these circumstances, the unanimous grant of adjustment as-
decided to seek elimination of tariffs on unfinished marble imports, which are vital 
to domestic production. This may be the first time that a liberalizing measure was 
recommended as an answ·er to an escape clause petition. 
97. Television Receivers &: Certain Parts Thereof, Tariff Commn. Pub!. No. 436 
(Nov. 1971) •. 
98. See note 35 supra. 
99. Stainless-Steel Table Flatware, Tariff Commn. Publ. No. 393 (May 1971) [here• 
inafter Flatware I]; Stainless-Steel Table Flatware, Tariff Commn. Pub!. No. 414 
(Aug. 1971). A workers' petition by the employees of the firm involved in Flatware I, 
supra, was granted in Stainless-Steel Table Flatware, Tariff Commn. Publ. No. 442 
(Dec. 1971 ). 
100. See 19 U.S.C. § 1981(c)(l) (1970). 
101. Flatware I, supra note 99, at 3-4. 
102. A workers' petition involving three idle plants of the International Silver Co. 
had previously been granted. Stainless-Steel Table Flatware, Tariff Commn. Publ. No. 
347 (Dec. 1970). 
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sistance was a foregone conclusion under any conceivable interpreta-
tion of the statute. Indeed, as a result of negotiations with the 
interested contracting parties of GATT, the President re-established 
a tariff quota for stainless steel.103 
Similarly uncontroversial, at least with respect to the first causa-
tion requirement, is the recent decision in Cotton Osnaburgs a:nd 
Sheetings.104 Imports of coarse cotton sheeting, the principal product 
of the petitioner, had increased at an annual rate of 22% from 1964 
to 1970. The current rates of duty were 40% less than in 1930. The 
major concessions had occurred in 1948 and 1956 followed by annual 
minor Kennedy Round concessions beginning in 1968.105 However, 
there was evidence that in this highly competitive market "a small 
price difference, even of one fourth of a cent in the case of some types, 
may well be sufficient to determine whether a sale is made or lost."108 
The profit position of petitioner's plant, which closed in June 1971, 
deteriorated during the period of implementation of the. Kennedy 
Round.107 Under these circumstances, four Commissioners concluded 
that the recent Kennedy Round reductions in duties were the major 
cause of the increased imports, which in tum were responsible for 
the collapse of the firm and the unemployment of its workers.108 
The dissenters objected only to the second finding of causation; in 
their view the loss of military business and domestic competition 
rather than increased imports were to blame for the petitioner's 
misfortune.109 
When recent increases in imports are not or cannot be attributed 
103. Proclamation No. 4076 of Aug. 21, 1971, 26 Fed. Reg. 16561 (1971). 
104. Cotton Osnaburgs & Sheetings, Tariff Commn. Pub!. No. 426 (Oct. 1971). 
105. Id. at 4-5. 
106. Id. at 6. In Women's & Misses' Dress Shoes, Tariff Commn. Publ. No. 223 
Oune 1970), Telief granted, 7 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS 618 (1971), 
the three Commissioners voting in favor of adjustment assistance for the firm and work-
ers noted that modest concessions can cause the demise of marginal operators. Id. at Ill. 
Accord, Women's Dress Shoes, Tariff Commn. Publ. No. 379 (April 1971), Telief granted, 
7 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRF.SIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS 618 (1971). Compare Women's Vinyl 
Sandals, Tariff Commn. Publ. No. 437 (Nov. 1971) (one cent a pair reduction in duty 
could not have caused 19 million pair increase in imports; low labor costs were more 
important than tariff reductions). 
107. Cotton Osnaburgs & Sheetings, supra note 104, at 7. 
108. Id. at 5-6. The majority opinion in Certain Yams, Fabrics & Other Textile 
Products, Tariff Commn. Publ. No. 422 (Nov. 1971), follows Cotton Osnaburgs. The two 
dissenters attributed the manufacturer's troubles to difficulties in modernizing its 
plant and denied that either of the causation requirements had been met. Certain 
Yarns, supm, at 12-lll, 28-29. One of the dissenters wrote a letter to the President accus-
ing the Commission of procedural irregularities. 
109. Cotton Osnaburgs & Sheetings, supra note 104, at 10-12. On that ground a 
unanimous Commission denied the petition in Certain Cotton Yarns & Fabrics, Tariff 
Commn. Pub!. No. 275 (March 1971). 
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to recent trade concessions, petitioners face a more complicated prob-
lem, as illustrated by the three-to-one vote in Certain Woven Fab-
rics.110 The company had closed its mill at the end of 1969 following 
three years of operating losses. Duties on the type of cotton cloth that 
the firm was making had decreased from 1930 to 1969 by about one 
third, the largest reduction having occurred in 1955. Imports of 
cotton cloth during the latter part of the sixties were several times 
greater than in 1955. As to fabrics of man-made fibers, the major 
reductions of tariffs occurred in 1936, 1948, and 1951 but import 
increases became substantial only in 1959 and have grown ever 
since.111 Commissioners Sutton, Clubb, and Moore held that the firm's 
injury had been caused by concession-generated increased imports, 
which had deprived it of customers and prevented it from shifting to 
fabrics outside its customary line.112 Commissioner Leonard's dissent 
denied causation on both counts. He noted that the bulk of the re-
duction in rates was made long before there was any significant in-
crease in imports, that some imported shirts would undersell like 
domestic products even if the 1930 rate were to be restored, and that 
lower foreign labor costs and the company's inability to adapt itself 
to changes in demand that occur every five or six years were the major 
causes of the shutdown.113 Although the "but for" test was not ex-
plicitly mentioned in either opinion, it would seem that the majority 
relied on it because they ignored the time lag between concessions 
and increased imports and because there was a disagreement about 
the causes of the company's shutdown. 
In three of the cases in which the President broke a tie vote by 
ordering relief, there were votes by Commissioners Clubb and Moore 
for petitioners based on the "but for" test, and votes by Commis-
sioners Sutton and Leonard against petitioners rejecting the "but for" 
test. Coils and Antennas114 involved a plant producing component 
parts for radio and television receivers that were competitive with 
imported parts. Imports had tripled between 1966 and 1970. The 
major duty reductions, accounting for 75% of total reductions, oc-
110. Certain Woven Fabrics, Tariff Commn. Publ. No. 342 (Nov. 1970) [hereinafter 
Woven Fabrics]. A petition by workers of the same company was granted in Certain 
Woven Fabrics, Tariff Commn. Pub]. No. 357 (March 1971). 
111. Woven Fabrics, supra note 110, at 4. 
112. Id. at 4-5. 
113. Id. at 8-9. On the same grounds three Commissioners voted for denial in Men's 
& :Boys' Shirts, Not Knit, Tariff Commn. Pub!. No. 439, at 9 (Nov, 1971). Three other 
Commissioners voted for relief. Id. at 3. As of Feb. 1, 1972, the President had not acted. 
114. Coils & Antennas, Tariff Commn. Publ. No. 385 (April 1971) (Commission 
equally divided), relief granted, 7 WEEKLY CoMP. OF PRESIDENTIAL DocUMENTS 854 (1971). 
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curred more than two decades ago, long before these items became 
significant articles of commerce.115 On that basis, the issue between 
the proponents and opponents of the "but for" test was clearly drawn. 
The President made the ultimate decision for the proponents. The 
equal division was due to one vacancy and one Commissioner's ab-
sence.116 
Practically on all fours are two other cases in which two vacancies 
on the six-member Commission produced equal division, thus per-
mitting the President to intervene: High Fidelity Stereo and Related 
Equipment111 and Electrolytic Capacitors.118 But in a later case in-
volving another firm that produced capacitors, the petition was de-
nied by a «vo-to-one vote.119 Since Commissioners Clubb and Young 
did not participate, Commissioners Sutton and Leonard, opponents 
of "but for," constituted the majority. Hence the President could not 
act. 
These decisions indicate that sharp increases in imports during 
the latter part of the 1960's, when the inflationary boom accelerated,120 
are being evaluated differently by different groups of Commissioners. 
Those who hold that these increases would not have occurred if the 
tariff rates of 1930 had not been reduced and who also find serious 
injury or a threat thereof will prevail when absences or vacancies 
place them in the majority or when the President breaks a tie vote. 
In some cases, the "but for" advocates were in the minority. For 
instance in Women's Casual Shoes,121 relief was denied by a two-to-
115. Id. at 3-4. 
116. At the time of this decision the office of chairman was vacant and Commissioner 
Young did not participate. 
117. High Fidelity Stereo 8: Related Equipment, Tariff Commn. Pub!. No. 355 (Jan. 
1971), relief granted, 7 WEEKLY CoMP. OF PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS 475 (1971). Increases 
in imports occurred from 1965-1969; principal reductions in duties ended in 1951, 
followed by ½% reductions in the Kennedy Round. Commissioners Sutton and Leonard 
held that even at the statutory rate imported products would still be cheaper than 
domestic ones (id. at 5), while Commissioners Clubb and Moore, espousing the "but 
for" test, stated that the price differential in favor of imports was equal to duty re-
duction (id. at 9). This was a disagreement about the evidence: It would, of course, be 
consistent with the "but for" test to deny causation if the price differential in favor 
of imports would persist even if the statutory rates were restored. 
118. Electrolytic Capacitors, Tariff Commn. Publ. No. 335 (Aug. 1970), relief granted, 
6 WEEKLY Coin>. OF PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS 1345 (1970). The statutory duty of 35% 
had been reduced in 1951 to 12.5%. Kennedy Round reductions in the late sixties 
were minor. Commissioners Clubb and Moore held that imports would not have in• 
creased if the 1930 rate had remained in effect. 
119. Capacitors &: Semiconductors, Tariff Commn. Publ. No. 394 (May 1971). Peti-
tions by the workers of the same company were denied in Capacitors 8: Semiconductors, 
Tariff Commn. Pub!. No. 395 (May 1971). 
120. See The Troubles of U.S. Trade, MORGAN GUARANTY SURVEY, Sept. 1971, at 3, 6-7. 
121. Women's Casual Shoes, Tariff Commn. Pub!. No. 405 (July 1971). A practically 
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one vote with t1vo vacancies and one absence.122 Both sides referred 
to their respective opinions in Nonrubber Footwear.123 
There have also been unanimous denials of firm petitions. In 
one case involving women's shoes,124 there was the usual division 
with regard to the first causation requirement125 but unanimity in 
:finding the absence of serious injury or threat thereof.126 In another 
case relating to similar articles, the difficulties of the firm, ,vhich was 
still in operation, ·were attributed to specialization in high priced 
shoes, for which import competition was not severe, and to the 
domestic recession.127 The Commission denied any connection be-
t1veen increased imports and trade concessions in the case of articles 
that have been on the free list with a commitment by the United 
States to keep them there.128 · 
The question whether a domestic article is "like or directly com-
petitive with the imported article"129 has been raised in several cases 
involving imports of component parts of :finished products. Accord-
ing to what seems to be the majority view, the requirement is not 
met, and the case must consequently be dismissed, when imports of 
the component parts that are competitive with domestically manu-
factured parts have not increased; the fact that imports of :finished 
products containing the component parts have increased 'is deemed 
identical case is Women's Dress Shoes, Tariff Commn. Publ. No. 416 (Aug. 1971), in 
which a 2-to-l majority denied relief. See also Men's & Women's Footwear, Tariff 
Commn. Publ. No. 419 (Sept. 1971), in which a 3-to-l majority denied relief. Chairman 
Bedell and Commissioner Young concluded that the cause of injury was not increased 
imports but domestic competition and changes in styles. Id. at 4. Commissioner Moore, 
dissenting (id. at 9), referred to his opinion in Nonrubber Footwear (discussed in text 
accompanying note 67 supra). 
122. Commissioners Sutton and Leonard formed the majority, Commissioner Moore 
dissented, and Commissioner Young did not participate. 
123. Women's Casual Shoes, supra note 121, at 3, 6. For a discussion of Nonruhhcr 
Footwear, see text accompanying notes 66-71 supra. 
124. Women's Dress Shoes, Tariff Commn. Puhl. No. 388 (April 1971). 
125. Id. at 3 (Commissioners Sutton and Leonard holding increased imports not in 
major part a result of concessions), 5 (Commissioners Clubb and Moore holding in• 
creased imports were in major part a result of concessions). 
126. Id. at 3, 5. In Men's Footwear, Tariff Commn. Publ. No. 427, at 3 (Oct. 1971), 
"a small net loss" after three profitable years was held not to amount to injury or a 
threat thereof. 
127. Women's Dress Shoes, Tariff Commn. Publ. No. 411 Guly 1971). See also Men's 
Dress Shoes, Tariff Commn. Pub!. No. 421 (Sept. 1971) (imports not the major factor 
when the company, after closing its plant, purchased 90% of its requirements from 
domestic manufacturers and imported the balance). 
128. Manual Office Typewriters, Tariff Commn. Pub!. No. 358 Gan. 1971). 
129. 19 U.S.C. § 190l(b)(l) (1970). See also 19 U.S.C. § 190l(c)(l)-(2) (1970). "Directly 
competitive with" is defined in 19 U.S.C. § 1806(4) (1970). 
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irrelevant.130 On the other hand, some cases hold that parts imported 
as components of finished products are competitive with parts manu-
factured by domestic producers: 181 The latter view would seem to 
be preferable, provided it can be shown that increased imports of 
the finished products have injured domestic producers and their 
suppliers. 
Finally, in a recent case the Commission unanimously denied a 
petition by a firm organized in 1969, which had purchased a plant 
that had previously incurred substantial losses.132 The unfavorable 
operating results were found to be due to a change in customer pref-
erences: mass-produced photographic lenses, formerly the principal 
products of the plant, had lost popularity in favor of more sophisti-
cated and more costly products. Imports, stimulated at least to some 
degree by Kennedy Round concessions, increased prior to the take-
over of the plant by petitioner but not thereafter. The Commission's 
conclusion that increased imports were not the major factor causing 
or threatening to cause injury to the firm was, therefore, based not 
only on the finding of "changes in the product-mix,"133 but also 
on the novel proposition that a newly organized firm operating in a 
plant acquired from another firm must be presumed to be aware of 
the threat of imports that the selling firm had to face.134 In other 
130. See Paper Cones for Loudspeakers, Tariff Commn. Publ. No. 362 (Feb. 1971), 
in which relief was denied unanimously in four concurring opinions. Commissioner Sut-
ton observed that paper cones were not being imported as such and that "it is wholly 
untenable • • • to regard loudspeakers, radios, television receivers, or other fabricated 
goods having paper cones as component parts thereof as being paper cones at a later 
stage of processing." Id. at 9. See also Certain Variable Electrical Capacitors, Tariff 
Commn. Publ. No. 423 (Oct. 1971) (unanimous denial). In Heels, Soles&: Soling Sheets, 
Tariff Commn. Publ. No. 441 (Dec. 1971), Commissioners Parker and Leonard accepted 
this view, saying "a shoe cannot be deemed to be a heel •••• " Id. at 7. Commissioners 
Moore and Young denied relief on other grounds. Id. at 5. 
131. Electronic Transformers, Tariff Commn. Publ. No. 351 Gan. 1971) (workers' 
petition granted by 2-to-1 vote). See also Coils 8e Antennas, Tariff Commn. Publ. No. 
385 (April 1971) (Commission equally divided), relief granted, 7 WEEKLY COMP. OF 
PRESIDENTIAL DocUMENTS 854 (1971). The Electronics Transformers case was cited by 
Commissioner Moore in his dissent in Heels for Women's Footwear, Tariff Commn. 
Publ. No. 440, at 10 (Nov. 1971). 
132. Optical Elements, Tariff Commn. Publ. No. 425 (Oct. 1971). 
133. Id. at 4. 
134. Id. at 5. Accord, Certain Bovine Leather, Tariff Commn. Publ. No. 433, at 7 
(Nov. 1971). Other reasons for the denial in Bovine Leather were obsolete facilities and 
the fact that the firm was a processor but not a producer and 19 U.S.C. § 190l(c)(l) 
(1970) (which delineates the requirements for adjustment assistance) applies only to 
producers. Id. at 3-6. This was the first holding interpreting the statute so narrowly. 
Petitioner was tanning hides according to the specifications of his customer, and this 
operation was held to be a service. The legislative policy would be better served if 
the tanning were considered tantamount to production. 
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words, the acquiring firm cannot ground its petition for adjustment 
assistance on the fact that it has made a bad bargain; its request for 
relief must be founded on facts that developed after the acquisition. 
This proposition seems thoroughly sound. 
C. Workers' Petitions 
I. Relief Granted by the Commission 
Subsequent to the path-breaking Buttweld Pipe and Transmis-
sion Towers decision discussed above,135 the Commission granted 
additional workers' petitions. Relief in some of the subsequent cases 
might have been granted even if those prior cases had not been de-
cided the way they were. Two cases grew out of the escape clause 
investigation of Pianos and Parts Thereo/; 136 both stressed that the 
increases in imports coincided with Kennedy Round reductions and 
that customers of the now closed plants had turned to imports.137 
In two other successful workers' petition cases, the employers 
themselves had begun to substitute imports for their own production; 
this practice was held to be the major factor for petitioners' unem-
ployment.188 The reasons for switching to imports were not explained; 
the result is convincing only if it is assumed that the increase of 
concession-generated imports139 forced the employers to curtail or 
abandon their own production. 
Only nvo grants to workers and one to salaried employees rested 
explicitly on the "but for" doctrine, that if the 1930 rates had not 
been reduced imports would not have reached their present levels, 
and that the unemployment would not have occurred if the imports 
had not increased.140 It is noteworthy that in one of these reports 
the majority, consisting of Commissioners Thunberg, Clubb, and 
135. See pt. IV. supra. 
136. Pianos & Parts Thereof, supra note 55, discussed in text accompanying notes 
54-61 supra. 
137. Piano Actions, Tariff Commn. Publ. No. 331, at 3 Ouly 1970); Piano Keyboards, 
Tariff Commn. Pub!. No. 352, at 4 Gan. 1971). 
138. Silver-Plated & Stainless-Steel Table Holloware, Tariff Commn. Publ. No, 348, 
at 6 (Dec. 1970) (3-to•l vote) (hereinafter Holloware]; Women's Leather Shoes, Tariff 
Commn. Publ. No. 353, at 5 Gan. 1971) (2-to-1 vote). The dissenters suggested that 
softness in the economy and changes in market demand were the major causes of 
unemployment. Holloware supra at 8-9; Women's Leather Shoes, supra at 'l-8. 
139. In both Holloware (supra note 138, at 5) and Women's Leather Shoes (supra 
note 138, at 11), increases in imports followed the most recent concessions. 
140. Plastic or Rubber-Soled Footwear with Fabric Uppers, Tariff Commn. Publ. 
No. 321 (April 1970) (3-to-2 vote) (workers and salaried employees); Transformers, 
Tariff Commn. Publ. No. 351 Gan. 1971) (2-to-1 vote). Recent Kennedy Round re• 
ductions were mentioned, but were apparently deemed to be of no importance. 
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Moore, described the plant that had just closed as a "marginal enter-
prise" located in a building originally constructed in 1889.141 In-
expensive products, which were in greatest demand, could not have 
been produced at this plant without new investment. "Large vol-
umes" of such products had been produced domestically.142 Under 
these circumstances, the finding that "but for" the imports there would 
have been no unemployment is open to serious question since super-
annuated enterprises are not likely to be able to compete in the 
domestic market. Hence the unemployment cannot have been due 
in major part to increased imports. The decision is inconsistent with 
several unanimous denials to be discussed later.143 
A recent grant of a workers' petition involved imports of polyester 
cotton fabrics.144 The duty on the bulk of these imports had not 
changed since 1958, while the increases in imports occurred during 
the latter half of the sixties. Commissioner Leonard's dissent denied 
the connection between trade concessions and increased imports, 
relying on the statement of the employer, who attributed his plight 
to low foreign wages.145 
2. Relief Granted by Presidential Action 
We discussed above the firm petitions ultimately decided by the 
President by breaking a tie vote in favor of relief.146 The same dif-
ficulty occurred in certain workers' cases. These cases pose the pro-
cedural problem of whether tie votes can be avoided. Since Congress 
entrusted the decision to the Commission in the first place, we must 
assume that the Presidential authority to break tie votes was intended 
only as a last resort in case of deadlock.147 A deadlock is inescapable 
when all six Commissioners148 participate in a three-to-three vote or, as 
has repeatedly happened, the Commission's membership is reduced 
to four through vacancies and the votes are equally divided.149 Apart 
141. Plastic or Rubber-Soled Footwear, supra note 140, at 9. 
142. Id. at IO. 
143. See pt. V. C. 3. infra. 
144. Broadwoven Polyester-Cotton Fabrics, Tariff Commn. Pub!. No. 434 (Nov. 1971). 
145. Id. at 7. 
146. See text accompanying notes 114-19 supra. 
147. By contrast, § l(a) of the Antidumping Act, 19 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1970), provides 
that the Tariff Commission "shall be deemed to have made an affirmative determination 
if the Commissioners voting ••. are evenly divided •••• " 
148. 19 U.S.C. § 1330(a) (1970), establishes a Commission of six members. 
149. See, e.g., Automotive Soft Trim, Tariff Commn. Pub!. No. 333 (Aug. 1970), 
relief granted, 6 WEEKLY CoMP. OF PRFSmENTIAL DOCUMENTS 1345 (1970); Protective 
Footwear of Rubber or Plastics, Tariff Commn. Pub!. No. 330 Guly 1970), relief granted, 
6 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRFSIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS 1345 (1970); Electrical Components & 
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from these situations, tie votes should be avoided by requiring every 
sitting Commissioner to participate. But no such requirement has 
been imposed.160 
In most of the workers' cases decided by the President in favor 
of the petitioners, Commissioners Clubb and Moore, the originators 
of the "but for" test, had voted for relief, and Commissioners Sutton 
and Leonard, opponents of that test, for rejection. Perhaps note-
worthy is Deflection Yokes and Horizontal Output Transformers,11l1 
in which the statement that the major concessions had occurred more 
than two decades earlier162 was answered by the counterstatement 
that trade agreement concessions since 1930 were "a decisive factor 
contributing to the increased imports,"163 which in turn had caused 
the unemployment. The plant had been sold and the employer had 
moved its operations first to Portugal and then to Mexico.m With 
respect to the second causation requirement, the "but for" test pre-
sumably implied that the employer could meet import competition 
only by producing abroad. Foreign investment may thus adversely 
affect employment in this country166 when domestic firms feel com-
pelled to emigrate.166 
Apparatus &: Allied Products, Tariff Commn. Puhl. No. 329 Uuly 1970), relief granted, 
6 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS 1345 (1970). 
150. In four cases in which the President broke the tie, one or two Commissioners 
did not participate. Women's &: Misses' Footwear, Tariff Commn. Puhl. No. 361 (Feb. 
1971) equally divided ':Otes in TEA-W-37 through -41, -44-, -47, -49, -54), relief granted, 
7 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS 618 (1971); Women's, Children's & In-
fants' Footwear, Tariff Commn. Puhl. No. 369 (March 1971) (equally divided votes in 
TEA-W-59-65), relief granted, 7 WEEKLY Co:r.lP. OF PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS 618 
(1971); Deflection Yokes&: Horizontal Output Transformers, Tariff Commn. Publ. No. 
386 (1971), relief granted, 7 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS 854 (1971); 
Pipe Organs, Tariff Commn. Puhl. No. 397 Uune 1971), relief granted, 7 WEEKLY 
COMP. OF PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS 1097 (1971). 
151. Deflection Yokes&: Horizontal Output Transformers, Tariff Commn. Puhl. No. 
386 (April 1971), relief granted, 7 WEEKLY CoMP. OF PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS 854 
(1971). 
152. Id. at 3-4. 
153. Id. at 7. Similar arguments were made in Pipe Organs, Tariff Commn. Puhl. 
No. 397, at 7-8 aune 1971), relief granted, 7 WEEKLY CO:r.lP, OF PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS 
1097 (1971). 
154. Deflection Yokes&: Horizontal Output Transformers, supra note 151, at 9. 
155. It may also affect American exports if the firm moves abroad in order to 
produce inside foreign tariff walls to save costs in lieu of exporting from the United 
States. UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC 'POLICY IN AN INTERDEPENDENT WoRLD, 
REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT BY THE COMMN. ON INTL. TRADE AND INVESTMENT POLICY 175 
(1971) [hereinafter WILLIAMS REPORT], states that in 1968 United States imports from 
American owned foreign manufacturing plants amounted only to $400 million. For a 
more pessimistic view of the adverse effect of these imports on United States employ-
ment, see the statement of Paul Jennings, President, International Union of Electrical, 
Radio and Machine Workers, in Hearings Before Subcomm. on Foreign Economic Policy 
of Joint Economic Comm., 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 813-21 (1970). 
156. In Automotive Soft Trim, Tariff Commn. Publ. No. 333 (Aug. 1970), relief 
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An even more complicated problem of foreign operations by an 
employer was presented in Electronic Components and Apparatus,151 
in which the employer of the displaced workers had moved the bulk 
of its production of television receiver components abroad. It sold 
some of these components in Asia and Europe but the major part of 
its foreign output was shipped to the United States for sale to domes-
tic producers of television receivers. Many of these imported com-
ponents were entered under Tariff Schedules Item 807.00, which 
exempts from United States duty the value of the United States 
components contained in the entered articles.158 The disagreement 
between the Commissioners related not only to the application of 
the "but for" test to the first causation requirement but also to the 
evaluation of the foreign operations of the employer. Commissioners 
Clubb and Moore concluded that the attractiveness of the increased 
imports of components had forced the employer "to become an im-
porter himself,"159 while Commissioners Sutton and Leonard held 
that the unemployment resulted principally from a management 
decision to manufacture abroad.160 That decision was apparently 
motivated in large measure by the desire to take advantage of the 
special tariff treatment accorded by United States law to articles 
assembled abroad with components produced in the United States. 
The real question, then, was whether the employer would have used 
this loophole in American tariff law, the repeal of which has been 
proposed,161 even if there had been no increased import competition 
or whether this was a defensive strategy necessitated by such competi-
tion. A finding of causation between increased imports and unem-
ployment would be justified only in the latter alternative. 
Most of the remaining split decisions resolved in favor of the 
granted, 6 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS 1345 (1970), the disagreement 
within the Commission concerned whether the employer's decision to shift production 
to Ontario was due to the Canadian-American Automotive Agreement of Jan. 16, 1965, 
([1966] I U.S.T. 1372, T.I.A.S. No. 6093, codified at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2001-33 (1970)), which 
permitted duty-free entry of automotive parts from Canada into the United States, or 
due to the sale by American Motors of its Kelvinator Division, within which the Soft 
Trim operations were located. 
157. Electronic Components &: Apparatus, Tariff Commn. Puhl. No. 329 Ouly 1970), 
relief granted, 6 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS 1345 (1970). 
158. Id. at 4. Item 807.00, Revised Tariff schedule of the United States, 19 U.S.C. 
§ 1202 (1970), provides preferential tariff treatment for: 
Articles assembled abroad in whole or in part of fabricated components, the pro-
duct of the United States, which (a) were exported in condition ready for assembly 
without further fabrication, (b) have not lost their physical identity in such articles 
by change in form, shape, or othenvise, and (c) have not been advanced in value or 
improved in condition abroad except by being assembled and except by operations 
incidental to the assembly process such as cleaning, lubricating and painting. 
159. Electronic Components &: Apparatus, supra note 157, at IO. 
160. Id. at 4-5. 
161. See H.R. 6550, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971); H.R. 14188, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969). 
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petitioners by Presidential action concerned workers employed in 
the footwear industry. There was the familiar disagreement about 
the effect of ancient trade agreement concessions on increased im-
ports and about whether increased imports or other factors were the 
major cause in bringing about unemployment.162 
Particularly striking are the conflicting opinions in a case con-
cerning the workers of four shoe manufacturers, Women's and Misses' 
Dress Shoes (Lemar Shoes),163 in which Commissioners Sutton, Leon-
ard, and Newsom held that most increased imports occurred prior 
to the first reductions in duty on January I, 1968, when European 
"fashion leadership" had stimulated imports,164 while Commissioners 
Thunberg, Clubb, and Moore found that the 140% increase in im-
ports from 1965 through 1969 would not have reached their present 
level without the modest tariff concessions of the Kennedy Round, 
which were fatal to marginal operations.166 The President broke the 
deadlock in this and in nine other footwear workers' cases in which 
Commissioners Clubb and Moore relied on their opinion in Lemar 
Shoes to support their votes for relief.166 
3. Denials of Petitions by the Commission 
The numerous denials of workers' petitions can be classified into 
several distinct categories. First, as previously observed in some of 
162. Protective Footwear of Rubber or Plastics, Tariff Commn. Publ. No, 330 CTuly 
1970) (equal division in plastic- or rubber-soled footwear), relief granted, 6 WEEKL\' 
COMP. OF PREsIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS 1345 (1970); Women's, Children's &: Infants' Foot• 
wear, Tariff Commn. Publ. No. 369 (March 1971) (equally divided votes in TEA-W-59 
&: -65), relief granted, 7 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS 618 (1971); Women's 
&: Misses' Footwear, Tariff Commn. Publ. No. 361 (Feb, 1971) (equally divided votes 
in TEA-W-37 through -41, -44, -47, -49, -54), relief granted, 7 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRESI• 
DENTIAL DOCUMENTS 618 (1971) (Commissioners Clubb and Moore, referring to their 
opinion in Women's & Misses' Dress Shoes, Tariff Commn. Publ. No, 323, at 13 CTune 
1970), indicated in connection with the first causation requirement that recent modest 
tariff concessions "can be sufficient to cause the demise of marginal operatious•i: Men's, 
Youths' & Boys' Footwear of Leather, Tariff Commn. Publ. No. 324 aune 1970); Tele• 
vision Receivers, Tariff Commn. Publ. No. 376 (April 1971); Television Receivers, 
Radios, & Phonographs, Tariff Commn. Publ. No. 380 (April 1971): Women's&: Misses' 
Dress Shoes, Tariff Commn. Publ. No. 323 CTune 1970), relief granted, 7 WEEKLY COMP, 
OF PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS 618 (1971): Women's, Youths', Boys' &: Children's Foot• 
wear, Tariff Commn. Pub!. No. 378 (March 1971). 
163. Women's & Misses' Dress Shoes, Tariff Commn. Publ. No. 323 CTune 1970), 
relief granted, 7 WEEKLY Co:MP. OF PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS 618 (1971) [hereinafter 
Lemar Shoes]. 
164. Id. at 6-7. 
165. Id. at 13. 
166. Women's & Misses' Footwear, Tariff Commn. Publ. No. 361, at 7 CTune 1970), 
relief granted, 7 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS 618 (1971). In Women's 
Leather Shoes, supra note 138, in which Commissioners Clubb and Moore constituted 
the majority, Lemar was also cited as controlling. See also Women's, Youths', Boys' 
& Children's Footwear, Tariff Commn. Pub!. No. 378 (March 1971) (2-to-2 vote, one 
Commissioner not voting, tie broken by President). 
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the firm petitions, there were some cases in which the advocates of 
"but for" found themselves in the minority. Typical of these cases was 
Phonographs and Radio-Phonograph and Other Combinations.161 
The majority, disregarding the Kennedy Round concessions as minor, 
denied causation between increased imports and tariff concessions 
made two decades earlier. Moreover, increases in imports had begun 
prior to the Kennedy Round reductions. The lone dissenter was Com-
missioner Moore, one of the authors of the "but for" test; he empha-
sized that the difference between United States and Japanese direct 
labor costs in the assembly of a typical radio chassis was less than 25% 
of the total trade agreement concessions since 1934 and that the plant 
felt compelled to import chassis.168 
Second, a specific finding that the restoration of statutory duties 
would not be sufficient to make domestic products competitive with 
imported ones has led to unanimous denial.169 Significantly, in one· 
case the Commission, noting the enormous differences in hourly 
wages between the United States and the exporting countries, went 
out of its way to state that assembly workers in the major foreign 
supplying countries "are efficient in such assembly" and that, there-
fore, their low hourly earnings "are in great part translated into low 
unit labor costs."170 This reasoning underscores the important lesson 
that the lower-wage country does not have a competitive advantage 
over the higher-wage country solely because of its lower wages; 
otherwise the positive American trade balance, which was lost only 
recently, would be inexplicable. The low-wage country will be ahead 
only if its productivity is equal or nearly equal to that of the high-
wage country. General findings that unemployment was primarily 
due to an employer's inability to meet domestic competition will, of 
course, compel unanimous denial. This inability is usually evidenced 
by loss of business to United States rivals.171 
167. Phonographs &: Radio-Phonograph &: Other Combinations, Tariff Commn. 
Puhl. No. 409 Guly 1971). Commissioners Sutton, Leonard, and Young constituted the 
majority, Commissioner Moore dissenting. The Chairman did not participate. Com-
missioner Clubb's term had expired. 
168. Id. at 9-11. Accord, Capacitors&: Semiconductors, Tariff Commn. Puhl. No. 395 
(May 1971) (3-to-l vote, Commissioner Moore dissenting and Commissioner Clubb not 
participating); Ceramic Floor &: Wall Tile, Tariff Commn. Puhl. No. 318 (March 1970) 
(4-to-2 vote, Commissioners Clubb and Moore dissenting. Commissioner Thunberg, 
concurring, noted at 10 that a return to the statutory duty would more than double 
the current rates, but would not equal the amount of the price differential between 
domestic and imported tile). 
169. Toys, Dolls, Models &: Games, Tariff Commn. Puhl. No. 372 (March 1971). 
Stereo 8-Track. Tape Cartridge Playing &: Recording Systems, Tariff Commn. Puhl. No. 
349 (Dec. 1970). 
170. Toys, Dolls, Models&: Games, supra note 169, at 5. 
171. Electrical Conduit &: Fittings, Tariff Commn. Puhl. No. 424 (Oct. 1971) (total 
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Third, petitions have been denied on the grounds that the de-
cline in the domestic economy, crippling strikes, and shutdmvns due 
to superannuated equipment, managerial reorganization, shifts in 
consumer demands, and rationalization caused the unemployment.172 
A number of other cases defy ready characterization. In one 
unusual case, a unanimous Commission denied a petition be-
cause there was "no correlation •.. between the decline in the rate 
of duty resulting from trade agreement concessions and the pattern 
of annual imports."178 The statutory rate had been cut in half in 1948 
·without affecting imports, which increased only in 1966 and 1967. 
The first Kennedy Round reduction of 2% in 1968 resulted in an 
enormous increase in imports, but the second phase-a I% reduction 
-in 1969 was followed by a drop in imports of more than 50%. In 
domestic production increased, while sales of the employer decreased); Carbon Steel 
Wire Rod & Wire, Tariff Commn. Puhl. No. 418 (Aug. 1971) (seventy-year old plant 
with fifty-year old equipment); Household Chinaware, Tariff Commn. Puhl. No. 354 
Q'an. 1971) (ninety-year old plant; company unable to cater to prestige market); Rayon 
Staple Fiber, Tariff Commn. Puhl. No. 357 Q'an. 1971) (company's production displaced 
by new domestically produced fibers); Glass-Lined Steel Process Equipment, Tariff 
Commn. Publ. No. 370 (March 1971); Women's Dress Shoes, Tariff Commn. Publ. No. 
402 Q'uly 1971); Women's Leather Shoes, Tariff Commn. Publ. No. 399 Q'une 1971) 
(import competition weak with respect to employer's high-priced shoes); Men's Dress 
Shoes, Tariff Commn. Publ. No. 403 Q'uly 1971) (one of two plants was seventy-one 
years old) Women's, Misses', Men's, Youths' & :Boys' Footwear, Tariff Commn. Publ, 
No. 428 (Oct. 1971) (decline in popularity of company's products); Men's Dress Shoes, 
Tariff Commn. Puhl. No. 417 (Aug. 1971) (employer's name, assets, and inventory 
purchased by Wisconsin firm, which planned to "style-up" products to meet domestic 
competition); Women's Vinyl Sandals & Slippers, Tariff Commn. Publ. No. 448 (Dec. 
1971). 
172. Women's Leather Sandals, Tariff Commn. Publ. No. 404 Q'uly 1971) (prosperous 
firm closed plants for reasons "unrelated to the competitive effects of imported foot-
wear''); Footwear Uppers, Tariff Commn. Publ. No. 429 (Oct. 1971) (reorganization 
and relocation of plants by parent company; no showing of increased imports); Bicycle 
Tires & Tubes, Tariff Commn. Publ. No. 325 Q'une 1970) (imports declined in 1969, 
cessation of production one of several steps "to eliminate marginal operations''); Elcc• 
tronic Receiving Tubes & Transistors, Tariff Commn. Publ. No. 396 (May 1971) 
(majority rejected "but for" test, and noted that duty free imports contained American 
components (see note 158 supra and accompanying te.'Ct); Commissioner Moore, con-
curring, referred to "soft economic conditions in the U.S." and to a strike of more 
than three months duration); Fuel Injection Pumps & Nozzles, Tariff Commn. Publ. No. 
390 (April 1971) (closing of plant due to cutbacks of defense expenditures); Cupra-
monium Continuous Filament Yard, Tariff Commn. Publ. No. 384 (April 1971) (no in-
creased imports, substitution of less expensive yarns due to "general adverse economic 
conditions'') Women's Dress Shoes, Tariff Commn. Publ. No. 415 (Aug. 1971) (New 
York plant closed because employer refused union's demand to restrict production to 
New York State); Unwrought Zinc, Tariff Commn. Publ. No. 430 (Nov. 1971) (super-
annuated equipment, loss to new plants, and domestic cost price squeeze); ·women's 
Dress Shoes, Tariff Commn. Publ. No. 438 (Nov. 1971): Viscose Rayon Yarns Wholly 
of Continuous Fibers, Tariff Commn. Publ. No. 435 (Nov. 1971); Heels for Women's 
Footwear, Tariff Commn. Publ. No. 440 (Nov. 1971); Heels, Soles & Soling Sheets, Tariff 
Commn. Publ. No. 441 (Dec. 1971). 
173. Can-Sealing Machines & Parts, Tariff Commn. Publ. No. 373, at 3 (March 1971). 
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1970, with another 2% cut in duty, imports more than tripled.174 
Presumably, the mysterious zig-zag course of imports, demonstrated 
by the spectacular fall in 1969 followed by an even more spectacular 
rise, explains this decision. 
An even more unusual case was Stainless Steel Wire.175 The only 
trade concession was a 2% reduction spread over four years, begin-
ning on January I, 1968, a peak year in the employer's business. In 
December 1968, the chairman of the Japan Iron and Steel Exporters' 
Association and the associations of steel producers of the European 
Coal and Steel Community addressed letters to the United States 
Secretary of State announcing that their exports to the United States 
in 1969 would not exceed a stated maximum and that in 1970 and 
1971 such exports would be confined to limits representing at most 
a 5% increase over the preceding year. These commitments were 
made on the assumption that total shipments to the United States 
from all steel exporting nations would not exceed 14 million net 
tons during 1969 and would be limited to 5% increases in each of 
the following years, and that the United States would refrain from 
imposing increased import duties or quotas. It was also assumed 
that these proposals did not violate United States laws.176 These un-
precedented undertakings, which have since been followed by com-
parable understandings relating to textiles,177 were intended to and 
174. Id. at 4. 
175. Stainless Steel Wire, Tariff Commn. Publ. No. 383 (April 1971). 
176. 60 DEPT. OF STATE BULL. 93, 94 (1969). These communications were forwarded 
to the Chairmen of the House Ways and Means and Senate Finance Committees. One 
may wonder how these private undertakings to limit imports to the United States can 
be reconciled with the policy of the antitrust laws. The fact that they were the result 
of negotiations encouraged by the Government presumably immunizes the participants 
from liability. 
177. The Textiles Agreements with Japan, Korea, the Republic of China, and Hong 
Kong resulted from long negotiations. See 7 WEEKLY CoMP. OF PRESIDENTIAL Docu-
MENTS 1408 (1971) (Remarks of R.L. Ziegler, Press Secretary to the President). The 
"Memorandum of Understanding with Japan," typical of the others, states that 
Japan will apply restraints to wool and man-made fiber textile exports to the U.S. 
for three years beginning Oct. 1, 1971. The base level shall be 950 million square 
yards equivalent for all wool and man-made fiber textiles products divided be-
tween wool and man-mades as in U.S. imports during the 12 months period ending 
March 31, 1971. 
Annual growth rates are specified. The textile industry did not file a petition for 
escape clause relief, and only five firm petitions and eight workers' petitions were filed 
by its members. The contrast with the shoe industry (see text following note 190 infra), 
is significant. As to shoes, there were informal discussions with the Italian Government 
which resulted in a unilateral order (Protocol No. A/611163, June 26, 1971, Ministry 
of Foreign Trade Circular) requiring the chambers of commerce throughout Italy to 
make exports of fooavear to the United States subject to the presentation of a foreign 
excliange certificate and invoices, accompanied by a visa of the chambers of commerce 
to the customs authorities. The chambers were to report monthly on all visas issued. 
The document refers to the possibility of import restrictions on shoes by the United 
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did forestall Congressional pressure for quotas.178 "Voluntary" com-
mitments by the major exporting countries were deemed preferable 
to legislated quotas, which would have been in violation of the GA TT 
agreement.179 The rigidity and semi-permanency of quotas was dis-
carded in favor of a more flexible arrangement that the parties could 
claim was consensual in spite of the fact that it had been obtained by 
legislative threats. In short, it was expected that these "voluntary" 
restraints would provide sufficient protection for American industries 
that clamored for relief. 
Ironically, for the Carpenter Technology Corporation, the em-
ployer of petitioners, the agreement to limit steel imports had a dis-
asterous effect on its North Brunswick plant. The foreign importers 
changed their product mix by shipping to the United States a larger 
proportion of their more expensive products such as stainless steel 
wire; it was this increase in imports that compelled the closing of the 
plant and caused the petitioners' unemployment. A unanimous Com-
mission was thus forced to conclude that the major cause of the in-
crease in imports and of the unemployment was the program of 
voluntary restraints rather than tariff concessions.180 Significantly, 
Japanese automakers are reported to have engaged in a similar ploy 
to get around the surcharge on imports imposed by President Nixon 
on August 15, 1971, and revoked on December 20, 1971.181 By empha-
sizing luxury and sporty cars, which appeal to customers who do not 
worry about price, they "limit their very visible unit sales volumes 
without a proportionate loss in dollar income."182 
The experience of the Carpenter Technology Corporation demon-
strates the ingenuity of foreign enterprises in circumventing "volun-
tary" restrictions of their exports when these restriction are stated 
States Government, which would have "grave consequences" for Italy, I am indebted 
for this information to Theodore R. Gates, Esq., Assistant Special Representative for 
Trade Negotiations, Executive Office of the President. 
178. Quotas on steel imports were proposed in S. 2537, 90th Cong., 1st Sess, (1967), 
and H.R. 3, 132, 180, 3289 & 3330-32, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969). A bill imposing 
quotas on shoes and textiles was passed by the House of Representatives in November 
1970 (H.R. 18970, 91st Cong., 2 Sess. (1970)), but was not voted on in the Senate, 
Similar bills in the 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (H.R. 20, 442 & 5070 (1971); S. 4 (1971)) and 
bills proposing quotas on all imports (S. 2592 & H.R. 10914 (1971)) have not been 
acted on. Chairman Mills of the House Ways and Means Committee has stated that 
quotas on textiles would not be needed if the United States and Japan could come to 
an agreement on limitations of Japanese exports. N.Y. Times, Dec. 31, 1970, at 29, col, 5, 
179. See Fulda, Book Review, 69 MICH. L. REv. 783 (1971). 
180. Stainless Steel Wire, supra note 175, at 5. 
181. Proclamation No. 4074, 36 Fed. Reg. 15724 (1971); Proclamation No. 4098, 36 
Fed. Reg. 24201 (1971). The surcharge was intended to be a bargaining device to bring 
about agreement on new parities for the major currencies. 
182. Wall St. J., Nov. II, 1971, at I, col. 6, 
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in over-all terms of historical shipments. The President's Com-
mission on International Trade and Investment Policy (Williams 
Commission) has recommended that "orderly marketing agreements" 
be negotiated within GA TT "under internationally agreed stan-
dards" whenever "imports of particular products cause or threaten 
to cause severe domestic adjustment problems in more than one 
importing country."183 This procedure would be preferable to the 
present United States practice, which relies entirely on political 
bargaining induced by pressures from domestic industries.184 
VI. CRITICAL COMMENTS ON THE CASE LAW: 
THE NEED FOR NEW RUI.ES 
The numerous decisions surveyed above, to which new ones are 
constantly being added, present a confusing and unsatisfactory picture 
that cries out for reform. With respect to procedure, we have already 
noted that equal division of the Commission could have been avoided 
in numerous cases by a rule requiring participation of all sitting 
Commissioners. This requirement would substantially reduce the 
opportunity for the President to break tie votes. On the substantive 
side reform will be more complicated and ultimately will require 
new legislation. The following is an attempt to identify the specific 
problems raised by the cases and the present statutes. 
A. The Relationship Between Industry (Escape Clause) Relief and 
Individual Adjustments 
The Williams Commission Report suggests that the eligibility 
requirements for escape clause relief on the one hand and individual 
adjustment assistance for firms and workers on the other should not 
remain identical but that the former should be more severe than the 
latter.185 
There are two fairly obvious reasons for this proposed difference 
in standards. In the first place, escape clause relief is granted to an 
industry in the form of an "increase in, or imposition of, any duty 
183. WILLIAMS REPORT, supra note 155, at 64. The Williams Commission referred 
to the Long Term Cotton Textile Arrangement (Feb. 9, 1962, [1962] 3 U.S.T. 2672, 
T.I.A.S. No. 6940, extended to Sept. 30, 1973, [1970] 2 U.S.T. 1970, T.I.A.S. No. 6940) as 
an example. Article 4 of this agreement allows bilateral arrangements not inconsistent 
with the basic objectives of this agreement; under it, the United States has entered 20 
such bilaterals. 
184. See Metzger, Injury and Market Disruptions from Imports, in papers sub-
mitted for WlLLIAMS REPORT (supra note 155) [hereinafter WILLIAMS PAPERS], pt. I, at 
167. For the views of specific industries, see Stinson, The Import Problem of the 
American Steel Industry, in id., pt. I, at 289; Lynn, The Import Problem of the Ameri-
can Textile and Apparel Industy, in id., pt. I, at 303. 
185. WILLIAMS REPORT, supra note 155, at 49-51. 
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or other import restriction on the article causing or threatening to 
cause serious injury to such industry."186 This action would entitle 
other countries affected by such action to withdraw "substantially 
equivalent concessions,"187 thereby harming United States exports. 
In contrast, individual adjustment assistance to firms or workers has 
no international repercussions since it affords relief only to the peti-
tioners. Hence it is logical that escape clause relief should be more 
difficult to obtain than individual relief. This conclusion follows 
from the commitment of the United States, in its own best interest, 
to liberal world trade, which, in spite of steel and textile agreements 
and so far unsuccessful proposals for quota legislation, is still the 
guiding principle of our foreign economic policy.188 The raising of 
trade barriers should, therefore, not be encouraged but used only as 
a last resort in emergency situations of wide impact. 
The second reason is closely related to the first. Escape clause 
relief is intended to be available only when an entire industry is 
suffering serious injury. Since it rarely, if ever, happens that every 
firm in the industry is adversely affected by imports, there are bound 
to be some enterprises that would get a windfall of undeserved pro-
tection if tariffs were raised or quotas imposed. Other firms may have 
suffered some losses without impairment of their capacity to survive. 
Inclividual adjustment assistance, on the other hand, is exclusively 
tailored to the need of firms that are in difficulty and of workers who 
have lost their jobs. Helping them involves some cost to the tax• 
payer, which can be justified on the ground that these firms and 
workers are the victims of the national policy of liberalized trade. 
The benefits of that policy to consumers and to the national economy, 
which is challenged by imports to maintain its competitive drive and 
which would be damaged by foreign retaliation to our import restric-
tions, presumably far outweigh the relatively small expense of public 
funds for adjustment assistance.189 Moreover, the realignment of 
currencies achieved by the Agreement of the Group of Ten on 
December 18, 1971, is expected to create more favorable conditions 
186. 19 U.S.C. § 198l(a){l) (1970). 
187. GATT, art. XIX, para. 3. 
188. "Let us see to it that as far as trade barrien; are concerned that it is a two-way 
street, that markets abroad are open to the United States as we open markets in the 
United States to nations abroad." President Nixon, remarks at Associated Milk Pro• 
ducers Convocation in Chicago, 7 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS 1242, 
1243 (1971). "Looking to the future, you can be assured of our cooperation in reducing 
barrien; of trade, rather than raising them •••• " President Nixon, remarks at White 
House Reception for Officials of International Monetary Fund, 7 WEEKLY COMP, OF 
PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS 1359, 1360 (1971). 
189. See WILLIAMS REPORT, supra note 155, at 48-49; Metzger, Adjustment Assis• 
tance, in WILLIAMS PAPERS, supra note 184, pt. I, at 319, 322-23. 
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for the United States trade balance and thereby reduce the number 
of industries that could invoke the escape clause.190 
Finally, the paucity of escape clause cases compared with the 
large number of adjustment petitions shows that the adjustment as-
sistance to firms and workers may be granted in many cases in which 
there may be no basis for escape clause relief for the industry to 
which these firms and workers belong. A particularly dramatic ex-
ample of this situation is the footwear industry, whose petition for 
escape clause relief was unsuccessful, but which accounted for 65% 
of all workers' petitions and 40% of all firm petitions decided in 
1970 and 1971. Even more significant was the President's recent 
action in the Marble and Travertine Products escape clause case noted 
above,191 in which he decided that individual adjustment assistance 
rather than tariff increases was the appropriate form of relief. This 
case demonstrates the wisdom of the present law in giving the Presi-
dent discretion in escape clause cases to provide either for tariff relief 
or for adjustment assistance or both.192 The proposal in the pending 
bills that would make it mandatory for the President to provide for 
adjustment assistance whenever he decides to ignore a Tariff Com-
mission recommendation for industry relief193 is a regrettable cur-
tailment of Presidential discretion. 
Our conclusion that escape clause relief should be more sparingly 
granted, and require stricter eligibility rules than adjustment assis-
tance, compels a discussion of these rules as they are reflected in the 
cases. 
B. The First Causation Requirement: Increased Imports Due in 
Major Part to Trade Agreement Concessions 
The cases show that the first causation requirement is the major 
stumbling block and that the controversy about the proper inter-
pretation of the statute involves the advocates and opponents of the 
so-called "but for" test. Since November 1969 these advocates, con-
sistently backed by the President's tie breaking vote, have prevailed 
in a number of cases. However, there are inconsistent holdings and 
the question cannot be regarded as definitely settled. 
The nub of the problem is the significance of the time interval 
between the granting of concessions and the increases in imports. 
190. BNA, International Trade Reporter's Survey and Analysis of Current Develop· 
ments, Dec. 24, 1971. 
191. See text accompanying notes 90-96 supra. 
192. 19 U.S.C. § 1902(a) (1970). 
193. S. 4, § 112 &: H.R. 20, § 112, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971), proposed amendments 
to § 302(a)(2) of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, 19 U.S.C. § 1902(a) (1970). 
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Everyone agrees, of course, that if that interval is short, causation "in 
major part" must be presumed. This agreement extends to cases in 
which small concessions granted by the Kennedy Round were fol-
lowed by increased imports even though there had been large con-
cessions years earlier. The difficulty arises when years or even decades 
have elapsed between the last concessions and the rise in imports or 
when recent concessions were so small that, in the absence of special 
circumstances, they cannot be assumed to have had any effect on 
imports. In such situations, "but for" means that causation "in 
major part" is present if the competitive advantage of the imports 
could have been prevented by maintenance of the 1930 Smoot-
Hawley tariff. In other words, "but for" wipes out four decades of 
turbulent American history. 
The hard facts of recent events do not support such a fanciful 
theory. All the cases deal with developments during the second half 
0£ the 1960's, which witnessed the "virtual doubling of U.S. Merchan-
dise imports."194 In some industries the surge was even greater. 
Specifically, "imports rose by nearly $7 billion between 1967 and 
1968, an increase of 23%,"195 This was a period of "severe over-
heating in the U.S. economy."196 Indeed, the federal deficit in 1968 
amounted to $25.2 billion, which was three times as high as in 
1967.197 Outlays for national defense (mainly the Vietnam war) 
amounted to 45% of the federal budget in 1968, and to more than 
40% in 1965 through 1967 and in 1969 and 1970.188 These inflation-
ary developments could not help but intensify upward pressures on 
domestic prices and wages199 with detrimental effects on exports and 
encouragement for imports. 
The repercussions of these pressures have been unfortunate. 
American wage rates have always been higher than those of other 
countries. Yet in this century they have been offset by the higher 
productivity of the American worker, as demonstrated by the con-
sistent excess of our exports over imports. This positive trade balance 
reaqied an all-time high during the first half of the 1960's when it 
194. WILLIAMS REPORT, supra note 155, at 45. 
195. Kravis, The Current Case for Import Limitations, in WILLIAMS PAPERS, supra 
note 184, pt. I, at 141, 143. During the same period exports increased by $3 billion, 
196. Houthakker, The U.S. Balance of Payments-A. Look A.head, in W1LLIA111s 
PAPERS, supra note 184, pt. I, at 31, 33. 
197. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL .ABSTRAcr OF THE UNITED STATES! 1971, 
at 373. 
198. Id. at 373. 
199. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Comparative International Labor Cost and Pro• 
ductivity, in WILLIAMS PAPERS, supra note 184, pt. I, at 535, 536. See also Abegglen, 
Dynamics of Japanese Competition, in id., pt. II, at 153, 156 ("U.S. inflation levels , , , 
have played havoc with U.S. competitiveness.'). 
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averaged $6.3 billion.200 But from 1966 to 1970 this average dropped 
to $3.7 billion201 and in 1971 the balance showed a deficit for the 
first time.202 
This development is confirmed by data showing the relationship 
between wage increases and productivity. The Bureau of Labor 
Statistics reports that during the first half of the decade "increases in 
hourly compensation in the U.S. were more than offset by larger in-
creases in productivity, resulting in a decline in unit labor costs, 
while the generally larger productivity increases in Japan and Europe 
were not sufficient to offset the even more substantial increases in 
hourly compensation."203 But in the second half of the decade, when 
inflation and the "guns and butter" program to finance the Vietnam 
War by deficit spending reached their peak, things began to turn 
sour: Based on a 1966 index of 100, United States unit labor costs 
reached 113 in 1969, compared to 102 in Japan and France, 101 in 
Germany, and 107 in Italy and the United Kingdom.204 During that 
same period, according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, 
average hourly compensation in U.S. manufacturing rose at a 5.8 
per cent rate; however, the productivity gain was only at a rate of 
2.1 per cent .... Hence, the rise of unit labor costs .... Productivity in 
European countries grew at annual rates of 4 per cent or more from 
1965 to 1969 and the rate of increase in Japan amounted to 15 per 
cent, in contrast to the U.S. 2.1 per cent rate.205 
These over-all figures indicate that, with respect to industries subject 
to heavy import competition-those which are involved in the Tariff 
Commission cases--United States competitiveness has been seriously 
200. STATI511CAL .ABSTRACT, supra note 197, at 766. 
201. Id. 
202. The temporary surcharge on imports (see text accompanying note 181 supra) 
was imposed by the United States to safeguard its balance of payments and on the 
ground that a trade deficit of $2 billion was forecast for 1971. See GATT Press Re-
lease of Aug. 26, 1971; Statement by the Deputy Undersecretary of State for Economic 
Affairs, N. Sammuels, at GATT Council Meeting, Aug. 24, 1971, released by U.S. 
Information Service. 
203. Bureau of Labor Statistics, supra note 199, in WILLIAMS PAPERS, supra note 184, 
pt. I, at 537. 
204. Houthakker, supra note 196, in WILLIAMS PAPERS, supra note 184, pt. I, at 36, 38. 
205. Bureau of Labor Statistics, supra note 199, in WILLIAMS PAPERS, supra note 184, 
pt. I, at 537. Taking 1967 as the base of 100, increases in the three succeeding years were 
as follows: Total output per man hour: 102.9, 103.7, and 104.6; compensation per 
man hour: 107.6, 115.4, and 123.6; total unit labor cost: 104.6, 111.3, and 118.2. 
STATI511CAL .ABsrRACT, supra note 197, at 224. For data on specific import-competing 
industries whose productivity growth lagged, see Bureau of Labor Statistics, Pro-
ductivity and Unit Labor Costs in Export and Import-Competing Industries, 1958-1968, 
in WILLIAMS PAPERS, supra note 184, pt. I, at 507, 515-16. See generally Bureau of Labor 
Statistics, The Meaning and Measurement of Productivity and Improving Productivity: 
Labor and Management Approaches, BULL, No. 1715 (Sept. 1971). 
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weakened by causes other than trade agreement concessions.200 The 
general assumption of the "but for" test, that tariff concessions since 
1934 have been the major cause of increased imports, thus appears 
to be untenable. Indeed, the cases that applied the "but for" test by 
and large confirm the conclusion of Professor Kravis that tariff con-
cessions did not play a major role in the increase in imports. Neither 
the reductions made in 1956 nor those in 1961 and 1962 had had a 
major impact on the increases in imports in the latter part of the 
1960's that coincided with the Kennedy Round and in many cases 
produced cuts in tariffs "that can hardly have amounted to an average 
reduction in price to U.S. buyers of as much as 1 per cent."207 
It follows then that the major cause for the doubling of imports 
during the latter part of the 1960's appears to have been American 
inflation with its unfortunate consequence of crucial losses in the 
high efficiency that prevailed until the middle of the decade. 208 It 
is to be hoped that the end of the war, the program to limit the 
domestic inflation, and a realignment of the major exchange rates 
will rekindle the competitive spirit.200 The conclusion is inescapable 
that the "but for" test as applied to determine the connection of in-
creased imports and trade concessions is a misinterpretation of the 
1962 statute. 
This leads us to the question of how that statute should be 
changed. The Williams Commission has recommended that appli-
cants for both escape clause relief and adjustment assistance should 
not be required to show a connection between increased imports and 
a previous reduction of duties resulting from a trade agreement con• 
cession.210 The three bills introduced in the House of Representatives 
206. The Bureau of Labor Statistics concedes, of course, that there are United States 
industries with no significant import competition. See Bureau of Labor Statistics, supra 
note 199, in WILLIAMS PAPERS, supra note 184, pt. I, at 539. 
207. Kravis, supra note 195, in WILLIAMS PAPERS, supra note 184, pt. I, at 149. 
Professor Kravis suggests that tariff changes have had relatively small effects on United 
States prices of imported goods and have brought about equal advantages for United 
States exporters. In some cases, because of the peculiar nature of the commodities in• 
volved, it has been found that very small tariff reductions would lead to greater im• 
ports. Id. at 163. See text accompanying note 106 supra. 
208. It has been suggested that "a relatively better cost and price performance is 
only a partial help towards a better competitive performance •••• Particularly in the 
consumer goods sector, U.S. firms may have to increase their flexibility and responsive• 
ness to changes in demand, here and abroad •••• " Solomon, Trade, Investment and 
the Balance of Payments Adjustment Process, in WILLIAMS PAPERS, supra note 184, pt. I, 
at 71, 79. 
209. President Nixon stated that his economic program was "designed to nurture 
and stimulate that competitive spirit; to help us snap out of the self-doubt, the self• 
disparagement that saps our energy and erodes our confidence in ourselves." Address 
to the Nation, Aug. 15, 1971, 7 WEEKLY COMP. OF PREsroENTIAL DOCUMENTS 1172 (1971). 
210. WILLIAMS REPORT, supra note 155, at 51. 
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early in the Ninety-second Congress would carry out this recom-
mendation.211 On the other hand, the Senate bill introduced in 
January 1971 by twelve Senators of both parties would retain the first 
causation requirement in modified form for escape clause actions 
while abolishing it for adjustment assistance.212 The latter bill re-
quires the Tariff Commission, in escape clause cases, to determine 
"whether an article upon which a concession has been granted under 
a trade agreement is, as a result, in whole or in part, of the duty or 
other customs treatment reflecting such concession, being imported 
... in such increased quantities ..•. "218 
Thus the Senate bill points in the right direction by intending to 
make the standards for escape clause relief tougher than the eligibi-
lity requirements for individual adjustment assistance. But the 
language used for that purpose is questionable. The proposed stan-
dard-that an industry applying for import restrictions has to show 
only that the increased imports were "in part" due to trade agree-
ment concessions-would go even further than the "but for" test 
by permitting industry relief on the basis of a finding that trade con-
cessions, however insignificant or ancient, contributed ever so slightly 
to the increase in imports. This standard would make the first causa-
tion requirement meaningless and thereby practically restore the 
equality of treatment of escape clause and individual adjustments. 
Indeed, the desirability of maintaining the present language of the 
first causation requirement is illustrated by the Commission's recent 
five-to-one decision in Television Receivers and Certain Parts There-
of,214 in which escape clause relief was denied because the increase 
in imports was attributed, "in major part," to dumping rather than 
concessions. If the dissent had prevailed, the industry might have ob-
tained both antidumping duties and a tariff increase. Perhaps the 
inconsistencies in the cases could be eliminated by addition of the 
following proviso: "Increased imports shall be presumed, subject to 
rebuttal evidence presented by petitioners, to have been caused by 
factors other than trade agreement concessions if three years or more 
211. H.R. 20, 442 &: 5070, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971). The three bills also contain the 
mandatory relief provisions for escape clause cases which were contained in the 1970 
bill and were convincingly criticized by Professor Metzger, supra note 6, at 375-76. As of 
December 1971, no action had been taken on these bills. 
212. S. 4, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971). No action has been taken to date. See Comment, 
The Trade Act of 1971: A Fundamental Change in U.S. Foreign Trade Policy, 80 YALE 
L.J. 1418 (1971). 
213. S. 4, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. § 111 (1971). H.R. 10192 and H.R. 10252, 92d Cong., 
1st Sess. (1971), introduced by Congressman Betts and nine other House Members, 
use the same language. 
214. Television Receivers & Certain Parts Thereof, Tariff Commn. Puhl. No. 436 
(Nov. 1971). 
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have elapsed between the granting of the concessions and the in-
creased imports." 
As explained above, most reform proposals would eliminate the 
first causation requirement for adjustment assistance to firms and 
workers;215 this change is clearly desirable. The individual adjust-
ment mechanism to hardship caused by imports need not be restricted 
to concession-generated imports. Such a restriction would limit the 
effectiveness of individual adjustment assistance as a safety valve 
against protectionist pressures and as a measure of relief to individual 
hardship caused by the free-trade regime of the GA TT. 
C. The Second Causation Requirement: Increased Imports Must 
Be the Major Factor in Causing, or Threatening to Cause, 
Serious Injury 
As to the second causation requirement, the Williams Commis-
sion recommended no change in the existing language for escape 
clause relief, but it suggested that adjustment assistance should be 
available whenever "an increase in imports contributes substantially 
to causing ... serious injury.''216 The four bills introduced at the 
beginning of the Ninety-second Congress would not differentiate 
between escape clause relief and adjustment assistance. Using identi-
cal language, they would require that the increased imports "con-
tribute substantially toward causing or threatening to cause serious 
injury to the domestic industry producing articles like or directly 
competitive with the imported article.''217 Two subsequent House 
bills, omitting any qualifying words, simply refer to increased im-
ports that cause serious injury.21s 
These proposals are less convincing than those directed at the 
first causation requirement. The cases demonstrate that the second 
causation requirement does not present difficulties comparable to 
those inherent in the first. By and large, the Commission has done a 
creditable job in determining when increased imports have or have 
not been the major cause of serious injury or threat of such injury. 
For instance, as we have seen, in numerous denials the Commission 
convincingly explained that the injury or unemployment was due to 
inability to compete ·with domestic rivals, corporate reorganization, 
215. H.R. 10192 (§ 301) and H.R. 10252 (§ 301), 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971), would 
keep the first causation requirement for adjustment assistance to firms and workers, 
with "in whole or in part" substituted for "in major part." 
216. WILLIAMS REPORT, supra note 155, at 51. 
217. S. 4 (§ 111), H.R. 20 (§ 111), H.R. 442 (§ lll), H.R. 5070 (§ 111), 92d Cong,, 
1st Sess. (1971). 
218. H.R. 10192 (§ 301), H.R. 10252 (§ 301), 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971). These bills 
make no distinction between escape clause relief and adjustment assistance. 
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recession, inflation, and other causes. There is, of course, always 
room for disagreement when the relative importance of a variety of 
complex factors must be weighed. But this difficulty could not be 
eliminated by any new legislative formula. 
Last, but not least, the merits of the second causation requirement, 
as expressed in the present statutory language, are considerably 
stronger than those of the first. The philosophy of adjustment assis-
tance is to relieve individual suffering caused by imports. To extend 
this relief to industries, firms, and workers to whose injury or un-
employment increased imports have made only a minor contribution 
would be to turn the adjustment machinery into government insur-
ance for inefficiency or for misfortunes only remotely connected with 
imports. This result would be fatal to the urgent national goal of 
revitalizing the competitive drive without which even seemingly 
advantageous currency realignments would be to no avail. Hence 
the existing law relating to the second causation requirement should 
remain as it is. 
D. The Substantive Benefits of Adjustment Assistance 
The substantive statutory benefits for firms and workers declared 
eligible for adjustment assistance have been explained elsewhere 
and need not be repeated here.219 Although some firms and workers 
have received substantial help, there has been much criticism of 
the existing law and its administration. One important reason for 
complaint is delay. For instance, in December 1971 the Tariff Com-
mission unanimously held that the former workers of the Utica 
Cutlery Company were entitled to receive adjustment assistance.220 
The firm itself had been declared eligible for adjustment assistance 
four months earlier221 but at the time the workers' petition was 
decided the firm's proposal to the Department of Commerce was 
still "under consideration."222 Apparently this is not a unique case.223 
The Williams Commission noted that "aid to workers becomes 
219. See Bureau of Domestic Commerce, Adjustment Assistance for U.S. Firms, in 
W1LLIA11rs PAPERS, supra note 184, pt. I, at 367; Department of Labor, Adjustment 
Assistance for Workers, in id. at 383; Metzger, supra note 6, at 389-97. 
220. Stainless-Steel Table Flatware, Tariff Commn. Puhl. No. 442 (Dec. 1971). 
221. Stainless-Steel Table Flatware, Tariff Commn. Puhl. No. 414 (Aug. 1971). 
222. Stainless-Steel Table Flatware, supra note 220, at 2. 
223. See Pierson, Promises, Promises. Firms Hurt by Imports, Assured of Help in 
1962, Find It Tough To Get, Wall St. J., Dec. 8, 1971, at 1, col. 6. The author refers to a 
New York executive as saying that every time he sends Commerce Department officials 
some figures to prove that his company has been injured, "they ask for more figures." Id. 
at 16, col. 4. This had been going on for half a year. As to difficulties encountered by 
firms, see WILLIAMS REPoRT, supra note 155, at 56-57; Fooks, Trade Adjustment Assis-
tance, in WILLIA?lrs PAPERS, supra note 184, pt. I, at 343, 352-53. 
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available long after the date on which actual layoffs have occurred 
and on which the process of relocation and training should have 
begun."224 Specifically, the time elapsed between certification and 
the start of benefits averaged sixteen months.221l Hence workers 
frequently do not begin to receive assistance until many weeks after 
they have lost their jobs. Since workers' allowances are limited in 
time, a large part will be paid retroactively; these payments will have 
to be used to liquidate debts incurred since unemployment began, 
thus making much of the adjustment allowance unavailable for sub-
sistence during the retraining period.226 
On the substantive side, the Williams Commission recommended 
wider benefits for workers, relaxation of the requirement concerning 
previous work and earnings, opportunities for technical and pro-
fessional (in addition to vocational) training, family health benefits, 
and protection of pension rights.227 For firms, the Commission urged 
more attractive terms of financial assistance at_ lower interest rates, 
tax benefits, and interim financing between approval and delivery 
of assistance. It indicated that such benefits should "normally be 
available only to small businesses."228 
These recommendations deserve serious consideration by Con-
gress, which in any event should set time limits ensuring speedy 
consideration and action. However, the additional recommendation 
to transfer eligibility determination from the Tariff Commission to 
the Executive Branch229 should be rejected: It is essential that such 
determinations continue to be made by an independent agency that 
is less directly subject to political pressure than the Executive. In-
deed, it cannot be repeated often enough that adjustment assistance 
to firms and workers should not degenerate into a general subsidy 
program. Adjustment assistance can serve the national interest only 
as a device to rehabilitate small businesses and workers-helpless 
victims of the nation's liberal trade policy-to the end that they may 
resume their places in the economy. And that inflation-ridden econ-
omy can be revitalized only by the competitive drive toward greater 
productive efficiency. 
224. WILLIAMS REPORT, supra note 155, at 53. 
225. Fooks, supra note 223, in WILLIAMS PAPERS, supra note 184, pt. I, at 350. 
226. WILLIAMS REPORT, supra note 155, at 54. 
227. Id. at 56. 
228. Id. at 58. See also Metzger, supra note 6, at 397-400. The Department of Com• 
merce has proposed to revise its regulations to provide for more accelerated procedures, 
See 37 Fed. Reg. 3726 (1972). 
229. WILLIAMS REPORT, supra note 155, at 54. 
